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ABSTRACT 
 
JONATHAN D. JONES: Personal Jurisdiction and Internet Defamation: An Analysis of 
Post-Zippo Jurisdiction Decisions in Internet Libel Cases 
(Under the direction of Ruth Walden) 
 
Obtaining personal jurisdiction over Internet speakers in libel cases has become a 
source of confusion for many appellate courts. The only United States Supreme Court 
jurisdiction decisions involving defamation cases came long before the Internet was a 
household communication tool. This thesis analyzes the various tests state and federal 
appellate courts applied from 1997-2010 in determining when an out-of-state defendant is 
subject to jurisdiction in a defamation claim based on Internet comments.  
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Chapter 1 
Personal Jurisdiction and Internet Libel 
A couple of years ago Scott Roberts, a Virginia resident, purchased an engine 
block from a specialty racing shop in Ohio.1 The engine was delivered by Kauffman 
Racing Equipment Company to Roberts.2 Eight months passed and Roberts became upset 
over what he perceived to be manufacturing defects with the engine.3 He contacted 
Kauffman Racing, and the company agreed to take the engine back for testing.4 At that 
point they couldn’t agree over who was at fault for the performance problems.5  Roberts 
still believed the problem was a manufacturing defect.6 Kauffman Racing claimed the 
problem was caused by modifications Roberts made to the engine, and the company 
refused to offer a refund.7  
Unhappy over the refusal to give him a refund, Roberts did what many 
disgruntled customers have taken to doing. He went to the Internet.  Roberts posted about 
his experiences with Kauffman Racing on eBay and several message boards for auto 
                                                 
1 Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, 930 N.E.2d 784 (Ohio 2010), cert denied Roberts v. 
Kauffman Racing Equip., No. 10-617, order (U.S. Jun. 28, 2011). 
2 Id. at 787 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5  Id. at 787-88. 
6 Id. at 788. 
7 Id.  
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racing enthusiasts.8 The owner of Kauffman Racing heard about the postings from at least 
five fellow Ohioans.9 So Kauffman Racing sued Roberts, claiming defamation, in an 
Ohio court.10  The first issue the courts had to decide was whether Roberts, who had 
never been set foot in the state, should be subject to jurisdiction in an Ohio court based 
solely on his Internet postings about an Ohio business.11 In a surprisingly broad opinion, 
the Ohio Supreme Court applied an expansive version of the “effects test” from Calder v. 
Jones12 to assert that an Ohio trial court had jurisdiction over Roberts.13 He had written 
about an Ohio company, his postings had been read in Ohio by at least five Ohioans, and 
the brunt of the harm was felt in Ohio.14 
The Ohio Court’s decision was the first of four from 2010 that seemed to mark a 
distinct shift in how expansively courts were willing to view jurisdiction in Internet 
defamation cases. The Seventh Circuit and the Missouri Court of Appeals both issued 
opinions allowing an assertion of jurisdiction over defendants whose primary contact 
with the forum state was writing about a resident of that state.15 And the Florida Supreme 
Court issued a ruling based solely on the state’s long-arm statute that would allow 
                                                 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 465 U.S. 783 (1984). In Calder the Supreme Court created a separate jurisdictional analysis that 
is applied, at a minimum, in defamation cases and perhaps in any intentional tort case. The test focuses on 
where the locus of the harm to the plaintiff is and whether defendant knew that the harm would occur there. 
Id.   
13 Kauffman Racing, 930 N.E.2d at 788 
14 Id. 
15 Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2010); Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W. 3d 389 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2010).  
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jurisdiction over Internet speakers who discuss Florida residents and whose speech is 
received in Florida.16  
These cases – on their surface – appear to indicate a new willingness by courts to 
take a broad interpretation of Calder’s effects test and assert jurisdiction in Internet 
defamation cases in which the speaker’s only contact with the forum is the speech. In 
contrast, the Fourth Circuit took up the jurisdiction question in 2002 in Young v. New 
Haven Advocate17 and developed a derivative test from Calder that gave significant 
weight to Calder’s discussion of express aiming and found a requirement that the Internet 
posts show an “intent to target and focus on” readers in the forum.18 And the Fifth 
Circuit, in 2002 in Revell v. Lidov,19 also took a slightly broader view of Calder’s effects 
test but still found reason to deny jurisdiction in an Internet defamation case. “[T]he 
‘effects’ test is but one facet of the ordinary minimum contacts analysis, to be considered 
as part of the full range of the defendant's contacts with the forum,” the Revell court 
wrote.20 The purpose of this thesis is to determine how courts are applying the Calder 
                                                 
16 Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. 2010). The case was in an odd 
procedural posture because the Florida Supreme Court was answering a certified question from the 
Eleventh Circuit in Atlanta about how to interpret the state’s long-arm statute, and it was not faced with the 
due process question. Id. The companion due process question was subsequently answered by the U.S. 
District Court for the Middle District of Florida, which found that jurisdiction could not be asserted because 
travelling to Florida to defend the case would place an undue burden on the defendant. Internet Solutions 
Corporation v. Marshall, Order, Case No. 6:07-cv-1740 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2010) available at 
http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2010-09-30-Marshall%20second%20dismissal.pdf.  
17 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002). 
18 Id. at 263.  
19 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002).  
20 Id. at 473 (citing Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 869 (5th 
Cir. 2001)).  
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effects test and what factors they consider relevant in determining jurisdiction in Internet 
defamation cases.  
Brief Overview of Personal Jurisdiction 
The Supreme Court first turned state exercise of personal jurisdiction into a 
constitutional issue in 1877 with Pennoyer v. Neff,21 a case involving the validity of an 
Oregon default judgment against a non-resident.22 The non-resident, Neff, had not been 
served in Oregon and had not appeared in the case, but he owned land in Oregon. The 
Court explained the limits of personal jurisdiction in the context of physical territory. But 
this limitation did not preclude the exercise of authority over non-residents who are not 
present in the forum. In fact, it recognized that a state court has the ability to protect the 
rights and property of state residents by exerting control over non-residents and their 
property.23  
This view of personal jurisdiction as solely a function of territorial presence 
did not last. In International Shoe v. Washington,24 decided in 1945, the Court began 
a long process of reframing personal jurisdiction by focusing on the contacts a 
defendant has with a forum.25  International Shoe called for an inquiry into whether 
the defendant “has certain minimum contacts with the [forum state] such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and 
                                                 
21 95 U.S. 714 (1877).  
22 Id. A more detailed explanation of the principles behind Pennoyer, as well as the jurisdiction 
cases that pre-dated the Court turning it into a constitutional question, is contained in Chapter 2.  
23 Id. at 735. 
24 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
25 Id. 
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substantial justice.’”26  The Court began its refinement of the minimum contacts test 
in 1958 in Hanson v. Denckla.27  In Hanson, the defendant was a Delaware trust 
company that was trying to avoid jurisdiction in Florida. It had never solicited any 
clients there, and its only contacts were with a trust settlor who had moved from 
Pennsylvania to Florida after the trust had been established.28 Because the trust 
company’s only contacts with Florida were the result of the settlor’s unilateral 
decision to move there, the Court found that company had not purposefully availed 
itself of the laws of Florida and should not have to go to court there:29 “[I]t is 
essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully 
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus 
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”30   
That refinement continued with World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson in 
1980.31 In that case, the Supreme Court explained that International Shoe’s minimum 
contacts requirement has two functions.32 The first is protecting a defendant from 
having to go to court in a “distant or inconvenient forum.”33 The second is protecting 
                                                 
26 Id. at 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).  
27 357 U.S. 235 (1958).  
28 Id. at 253. 
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
31 444 U.S. 286 (1980) World-Wide Volkswagen involved claims against a German car 
manufacturer’s American subsidiary and a dealership, both based in New York. The plaintiff filed suit in 
Oklahoma, where the car had malfunctioned causing an accident. Neither the dealership nor the 
manufacturer had any contacts with Oklahoma. Id.  
32 Id.  at 292.  
33 Id.  
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federalism by preventing states from “reach[ing] out beyond the limits imposed on 
them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.”34 Citing Hanson,35 the 
World-Wide Volkswagen Court explained that the question wasn’t whether the 
defendant could foresee any contact with a particular forum but whether “the 
defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he should 
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”36 It also stated that the 
foreseeability test is met when a corporation “purposefully avails itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State.”37   
The Court took an unexplained turn in its jurisdiction analysis in a defamation 
case over an article published in the National Enquirer. In Calder v. Jones38 the 
question of “purposeful availment” was never broached.39 Instead the Court focused 
on the defendants’ — both Florida residents — knowledge that the article would 
cause the “brunt of the harm” to the plaintiff in California.40  Rather than apply the 
purposeful availment standard the Court that had developed in its previous 
jurisdiction cases, the Calder Court crafted a new standard under which jurisdiction 
                                                 
34 Id. at 291-92. 
35 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
36 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. 
37 Id.  
38 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
39 Redish describes this as “depart[ing] dramatically from the logic of the purposeful availment 
standard.” Martin H. Redish, Of New Wine and Old Bottles: Personal Jurisdiction, the Internet and the 
Nature of Constitutional Evolution, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 575, 584 (1998).  
40 Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. The defendants in Calder included a reporter and editor, being sued as 
individuals, who had participated in the publication of an article about a California actress. The reporter 
had made some phone calls and at least one trip to California to report the story. The editor had no contacts 
with California that were directly related to publication of the article.  
  
7 
 
 
can be asserted if the plaintiff can show that the forum state was both the focal point 
of the act and the place where the harm was suffered.41 The court also introduced 
“express aiming” into the analysis of whether the defendants’ conduct was targeting 
the forum state: 
[P]etitioners are not charged with mere untargeted negligence. 
Rather, their intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were 
expressly aimed at California. Petitioner South wrote and 
petitioner Calder edited an article that they knew would have a 
potentially devastating impact upon respondent. And they knew 
that the brunt of that injury would be felt by respondent in the state 
in which she lives and works and in which the National Enquirer 
has its largest circulation. Under the circumstances, petitioners 
must “reasonably anticipate being haled into court there” to answer 
for the truth of the statements made in their article.42  
 
The Court however did conduct a minimum contacts analysis in Keeton v. Hustler 
Magazine, a companion case to Calder that also involved a defamation claim.43 In 
Keeton, the Court found the magazine’s monthly circulation of 10,000 to 15,000 
copies in the forum state, New Hampshire, was adequate to meet the Due Process 
Clause’s minimum contacts requirements. “Such regular monthly sales of thousands 
of magazines cannot by any stretch of the imagination be characterized as random, 
isolated, or fortuitous.”44 The Court’s ruling in Keeton is more in tune with the 
World-Wide Volkswagen line of cases than Calder because it focuses on whether 
                                                 
41 Id. at 788-89. 
42 Id. at 789-90 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen v.  Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980)).  
43 465 U.S. 770 (1984).  
44 Id. at 774.  
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Hustler magazine purposefully availed itself of the laws of New Hampshire by 
circulating more than 10,000 copies there.45  
 The Court returned to the purposeful availment framework in Burger King 
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, a contract dispute case between Burger King and its 
franchisees.46 The Court applied World-Wide Volkswagen but added a new wrinkle — 
directed conduct.47 The Court held that specific jurisdiction could be asserted over an 
out-of-state defendant when the subject had “fair warning” because “the defendant 
has ‘purposefully directed’ his activities at residents of the forum.”48   
 The Court’s personal jurisdiction cases after Burger King focus largely on a 
question dealing with manufacturers placing products into the “stream of commerce” 
and how far down that stream jurisdiction should extend.49 That issue returned to the 
Court in two cases decided in 2011,50 which marked the first time in 20 years the 
Supreme Court has revisited personal jurisdiction.  
 Courts have struggled with how to apply these two lines of jurisdictional 
analyses – purposeful availment and effects – in Internet-based cases generally and 
                                                 
45 Id.  
46 471 U.S. 462 (1985) 
47 Id. at 471-72.  
48 Id. at 472 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984)).  
49 See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); J. McIntyre Machinery, 
Ltd. v. Nicastro, No. 09-1343, slip op. (U.S. Jun. 27, 2011); Goodyear Luxembourg Tires SA v. Brown,  
No. 10-76, slip op. (U.S. Jun. 27, 2011). 
50 J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, No. 09-1343, slip op. (U.S. Jun. 27, 2011); Goodyear 
Luxembourg Tires SA v. Brown,  No. 10-76, slip op. (U.S. Jun. 27, 2011). 
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particularly in Internet defamation cases.51 In defamation cases there appears to be 
particular confusion about the role of the Calder effects test and what it takes to 
establish that a defendant knew that the brunt of the harm he or she was causing 
would be felt in the forum state.52 Further complicating the Internet jurisdiction 
picture is a 1997 federal district court opinion, Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot 
Com, Inc.,53 which introduced a new element to the analysis: a sliding scale of how 
interactive the Internet site is.54 This “sliding scale” test has been adopted by some 
courts, rejected outright by others, and incorporated as an additional analysis 
overlaying other jurisdictional frameworks by others.  
 
Literature Review 
The application of personal jurisdiction doctrine to Internet-based claims has 
generated a tremendous amount of scholarship55 from which a few central themes 
                                                 
51 See Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002); Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 
467 (5th Cir. 2002).  
52 See Kauffman Racing, 930 N.E.2d 788 (Ohio 2010); Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693 (7th 
Cir. 2010); Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W. 3d 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010); Internet Solutions Corp. v. 
Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. 2010). 
53 952 F.Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997) 
54 Id. at 1121. 
55 See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Internet Libel: The Consequences of a Non-Rule Approach to 
Personal Jurisdiction, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 473 (2004); Robert J. Condlin, “Defendant Veto” or “Totality of 
the Circumstances”? It’s Time for the Supreme Court to Straighten Out the Personal Jurisdiction Standard 
Once Again, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 53 (2005); Developments, Internet Jurisdiction: A Comparative Analysis, 
120 Harv. L. Rev. 1031 (2007); Catherine Ross Dunham, Zippo-ing the Wrong Way: How the Internet Has 
Misdirected the Federal Courts in Their Personal Jurisdiction Analysis, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 559 (2009); C. 
Douglas Floyd & Shima Baradaran-Robison, Toward a Unified Test of Personal Jurisdiction in an Era of 
Widely Diffused Wrongs: The Relevance of Purpose and Effects, 81 IND. L. J. 601 (2006); Michael A. 
Geist, Is There a There? Toward Greater Certainty For Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 
1345 (2001); Andrew F. Halaby, You Won’t Be Back: Making Sense of “Express Aiming” After 
Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 625 (2005); Allyson W. Haynes, The Short 
Arm of the Law: Simplifying Personal Jurisdiction Over Virtually Present Defendants, 64 U. MIAMI L. 
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emerge. What appears to be a nearly universal theme in the literature is the need for the 
Supreme Court to revisit and clarify personal jurisdiction doctrine.  “The Court’s 
inadequate guidance has led to lower court decisions that are weakly reasoned and that 
search for meaning where none can be found,” Peterson writes.56 Authors also question 
how jurisdiction should apply in intentional tort cases and whether the Internet deserves 
its own standard. 
The need to clarify personal jurisdiction 
There are two primary lines of argument about what the Supreme Court should do 
with personal jurisdiction. One calls for refinement of personal jurisdiction doctrine, 
irrespective of the Internet, in an effort to craft a set of universal rules equally applicable 
in the online and offline worlds for any civil claim.57 The second calls for a set of 
situation-specific jurisdiction rules that would keep the purposeful availment analysis 
intact in some scenarios and use the effects test in others. Proponents argue that this 
scheme would make it easier for courts to determine over whom they have authority.58  
                                                                                                                                                 
REV. 133 (2009); Scott T. Jansen, Comment, Oh, What a Tangled Web . . . The Continuing Evolution of 
Personal Jurisdiction Derived from Internet-Based Contacts, 71 MO. L. REV. 177 (2006); Rachael T. 
Krueger, Comment, Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice Lost in Cyberspace: Personal 
Jurisdiction and On-Line Defamatory Statements, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 301 (2001); Todd David Peterson, 
The Timing of Minimum Contacts, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101 (2010); Alexander B. Punger, Recent 
Development, Mapping the World Wide Web: Using Calder v. Jones to Create a Framework for Analyzing 
when Statements Written on the Internet Give Rise to Personal Jurisdiction, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1952 (2009); 
Martin H. Redish, Of New Wine and Old Bottles: Personal Jurisdiction, the Internet and the Nature of 
Constitutional Evolution, 38 JURIMETRICS 575 (1998); Allan R. Stein, Personal Jurisdiction and the 
Internet: Seeing Due Process Through the Lens of Regulatory Precision,  98 NW. U. L. REV. 411 (2004); 
David Wille, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet – Proposed Limits on State Jurisdiction over Data 
Communications in Tort Cases, 87 KY. L.J. 95 (1998); Dennis T. Yokoyama, You Can’t Always Use the 
Zippo Code: The Fallacy of a Uniform Theory of Internet Personal Jurisdiction, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1147 
(2005).  
56 Peterson, supra note 55, at 159.  
57 See, e.g., Stein, supra note 55.  
58 See, e.g., Redish, supra not 55.  
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In the group of authors seeking further development of personal jurisdiction irrespective 
of the Internet, Stein argues that both the purposeful availment and effects tests can be 
reconciled if the courts view them through a regulatory lens.59 In this view the need is not 
for wholesale abandonment of one, or either, but rather a refinement of a unifying theory 
behind each.60 The question, according to Stein, is “not whether a defendant has 
surrendered his or her liberty, but whether the state’s assertion of judicial authority 
sufficiently advances its regulatory interests to justify the attendant burden that such a 
proceeding would impose upon conduct outside of its territory.”61 Stein’s argument is 
rooted in the idea that the state’s regulatory interest is not in providing a forum for its 
resident after the fact, but in regulating a type of behavior before the controversy arises.  
Stein acknowledges that courts have struggled with how to apply jurisdictional standards 
in Internet cases, particularly intentional torts. “It’s not surprising . . . that courts have had 
a devilish time applying Calder in other defamation cases” Stein concludes.62 
Borchers, while arguing for refinement irrespective of the Internet, suggests that 
the Zippo test should be scrapped altogether, or, at a minimum, it should not be 
applicable in libel cases.63 He argues that Zippo makes no sense in the context of 
defamation because the level of activity that a website has is not particularly relevant to 
the reputational harm being asserted.64 A static website can host a statement equally 
                                                 
59 Stein, supra note 55, at 412.  
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 413.  
62 Id. at 423.  
63 Borchers, supra note 55, at 489.  
64 Id.  
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damning as a dynamic website, and the recipient will feel the same harm, he suggests65  
Geist agrees that the Zippo test is inadequate and calls for a technology-neutral, targeting-
based analysis.66  Geist argues that technology-neutrality allows a test to remain relevant 
even as web technologies change without discouraging online activity, and it provides 
sufficient certainty of legal risk for Internet users.67 A targeting-based approach would 
lessen reliance on the effects analyses rooted in Calder, Geist argues.68 Geist’s targeting 
approach would consider as factors whether there was foreseeability of jurisdiction on the 
part of the actor based on contracts, technology, and actual or implied knowledge.69 He 
criticizes the effects test as causing uncertainty because “Internet-based activity can 
ordinarily be said to cause effects in most jurisdictions.”70  
Among the authors making the case for rules specific to Internet cases, Redish 
argues that the purposeful availment test “cannot effectively deal with the dramatic socio-
economic implications of the Internet’s development. Pursuant to that standard, an out-
of-state defendant will not be subject to a forum’s jurisdictional reach unless that 
defendant has purposefully availed itself of the forum’s benefits and privileges.”71 This 
argument recognizes the difficulty in determining how an Internet user might 
purposefully avail herself of a state’s jurisdiction if her only connection with the forum is 
                                                 
65 Id.  
66 Geist, supra note 55, at 1380.  
67 Id. 
68 Id.  
69 Id. at 1385-97.  
70 Id. at 1381.  
71 Redish, supra not 55, at 578.  
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interaction over the Internet with another person or entity based in that state. Therefore, 
Redish calls for the Court to reconsider the theoretical foundation for personal 
jurisdiction. If it is rooted in federalism, as Redish contends, then application of the 
purposeful availment test to Internet-based claims “subverts a state’s ability to assert its 
sovereign power in order to protect its citizens.”72 Redish argues that purposeful 
availment as a prerequisite for jurisdiction should be eliminated, and instead the focus 
should be on a balance of the state’s interest and procedural fairness.73 
 The Court’s apparent split on jurisdictional analyses – using effects for intentional 
torts in Calder and the purposeful availment line of cases in other actions — provides 
justification for Yokoyama to argue that a single standard isn’t necessary.74  “[T]he 
traditional model of personal jurisdiction itself fails to support the notion that one test for 
specific jurisdiction should be applied to all claims.”75 While criticizing the Zippo sliding 
scale as inadequate, Yokoyama argues that traditional personal jurisdiction principles in 
the purposeful availment” and effects cases can be adequately applied to Internet cases:76 
“Because the Internet hosts a multitudinous array of activities and communities that now 
mirrors all aspects of society, the resolution of Internet jurisdiction must be sensitive to 
the defendant’s specific Internet activities.”77 
Personal Jurisdiction and Intentional Torts  
                                                 
72 Id. at 580.  
73 Id. at 609.  
74 Yokoyama, supra note 55, at 1174.  
75 Id.  
76 Id. at 1149.  
77 Id. at 1150.  
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Many commentators consider the Calder effects test as a separate framework, 
distinct from purposeful availment analysis, for dealing with intentional torts.  Confusion 
over which of the personal jurisdiction standards – purposeful availment, the Calder 
effects test, or the Zippo sliding scale — to apply has been widespread in intentional tort 
cases, particularly defamation cases, according to Floyd and Baradaran-Robison.78 Their 
research found courts that applied either the Calder effects test, the Zippo test, or some 
variation of both.79 Floyd and Baradaran-Robison argue that this widespread confusion 
among lower courts is a result of Calder’s poor guidance on the meaning of “express 
aiming” or “intentional targeting.”80 They contend that the question for courts becomes 
one of whether the defendant knew that the brunt of the harm would be felt in the forum 
state.81 Parsing out what standard of knowledge – actual or constructive – should be 
applied, and which the defendant actually held, is a process fraught with uncertainty.82 
According to Redish, the purposeful availment test cannot be satisfied solely by a 
defamation transmitted over the Internet. “A defendant has not ‘purposefully availed’ 
itself of the benefits and privileges of the forum merely because it has sent a defamatory 
communication over the Internet about a resident of the forum state,” he writes.83 Calling 
the Calder decision “aberrational,” “illogical” and unprincipled,84 Redish argues that an 
                                                 
78 Floyd and Baradaran-Robison, supra note 55, at 614-15.  
79 Id. at 617.  
80 Id. at 618.  
81 Id.  
82 Id.  
83 Redish, supra note 55, at 599.  
84 Id. at 603.  
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expansive use of Calder specifically for intentional tort cases over the Internet is 
inappropriate. A central element of Calder was California’s role as the focal point of the 
case, and that element is missing from many of the Internet-based intentional tort cases.85  
Yet Krueger argues that Calder’s effects test not only can satisfy purposeful 
availment in Internet defamation cases, but that it is the appropriate standard to apply in 
such cases.86 “The danger of rejecting defamation actions without analyzing the extent of 
the effects in the forum state becomes evident if non-resident defendants target a forum 
with defamation and escape punishment.”87 In Krueger’s view, the defendant’s intent to 
reach a particular forum and commit a harm against a particular plaintiff in that forum is 
where the focus of the jurisdiction decision should be.  
One interesting approach, mentioned by Borchers88 and explored in depth by 
Haynes, is for states to voluntarily limit personal jurisdiction by statute.89 While much of 
the literature has focused on the development of constitutional standards for jurisdiction 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is also the matter of 
statutory authority.  Jurisdictional analysis is a two-prong analysis. The first prong is 
whether the forum’s so-called “long-arm statute” authorizes jurisdiction; the second 
prong is whether assertion of that jurisdiction meets constitutional requirements. Most 
states, either explicitly in their long-arm statutes or through court interpretation, allow 
                                                 
85 Id. at 604.  
86 Krueger, supra note 55, at 328.  
87 Id. at 330.  
88 Borchers, supra note 55, at 490.  
89 Haynes, supra note 55.  
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jurisdiction to the full extent allowed by due process.90 Yet some states’ long-arm statutes 
exclude defamation cases from jurisdiction over non-residents.91 Haynes argues for states 
to voluntarily pull back on jurisdiction by limiting the extent granted under their long-
arm statutes.92 Under Haynes’ model “short-arm” statute, states would define the type of 
targeted activity that would give rise to liability:93   
This could take the form of a mens rea requirement—that the defendant 
knew the target of the defamation was located in or would feel the effects 
in the forum state, for example—or a quantity calculation where a single 
such targeted statement would be insufficient, but numerous efforts to 
target forum residents would suffice.94 
 
While this approach is interesting, it suffers from two problems. First, states are 
unlikely to voluntarily relinquish jurisdiction over intentional tort cases involving 
their residents. There is little incentive for a state to follow that path. Second, the 
initial formulation – “that the defendant knew the target of the defamation was 
located in or would feel the effects in the forum state” — bears a close 
                                                 
90 Haynes, supra note 55, at 162-63. Haynes’ research indicates that 32 states have either this 
explicit extension to the full authority allowed under due process or have court interpretations that allow 
jurisdiction to extend that far. 
91 Id. at 165 (citing, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-59b(a)(2) (West 2009); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(2) 
(McKinney 2009)).  The Connecticut statute says: “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any 
nonresident individual . . . who in person or through an agent: . . . (2) commits a tortious act within the 
state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act” CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 52-59b(a)(2) (West 2009). The New York statute says: “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction 
over any non-domiciliary . . ., who in person or through an agent: 2. commits a tortious act within the state, 
except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(2) 
(McKinney 2009).  
92 Haynes, supra note 55, at 166-74.  
93 Id. at 168.  
94 Id.  
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resemblance to the practical application courts have been giving the Calder 
effects test in Internet defamation cases.95 
 Halaby focuses on the need for the Court to clarify the express aiming 
element of the Calder effects test if it is to be used for intentional tort cases.96 
Halaby calls for two tiers of express aiming.97 The first is established when a 
defendant acts with purpose to cause an effect on the plaintiff, whether that’s in a 
specific forum or not.98 If A sets out to harm B, regardless of where B is, then B 
should be able to make a claim in whatever forum B is in. Jurisdiction would be 
appropriate when the defendant intends to harm the plaintiff in the forum. The 
second type of express aiming is when a defendant knew or should have known 
that his actions would cause harm to the plaintiff, either in the forum or knowing 
the plaintiff lives in the forum.99 In this approach, in order to assert jurisdiction 
under the second tier, one would need to couple knowledge that the resident could 
be harmed in the forum with a related forum contact.100 This second formulation 
tracks closely to the facts in Calder. Even if the Calder defendants didn’t intend 
to harm the plaintiff, they arguably knew or should have known that she lived in 
                                                 
95 See Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2010); Kauffman Racing Equip. v. Roberts, 
930 N.E.2d 788, (Ohio 2010); Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W. 3d 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
96 Halaby, supra note 55, at 625.  
97 Id. at 626 
98 Id.  
99 Id.  
100 Id. at 655.  
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California and could suffer harm in California based on their story. Halaby argues 
that this tiered system would lead to greater predictability.101 
Stein’s regulatory approach considers the state’s “legitimate claim to 
generating the legal order that governs the targeter’s extraterritorial behavior.”102  
In other words, the focus is returned to whether the conduct was targeted at a 
forum. Yet Stein acknowledges that this approach to personal jurisdiction analysis 
poses particular problems in defamation cases.103 States where intentional torts 
are targeted have “a legitimate claim to generating the legal order that governs the 
targeter’s extraterritorial jurisdiction.”104 He uses New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan105 to illustrate the point that one state’s regulatory interest in speech — in 
this case Alabama’s interest in protecting the reputation of its resident — can be 
in conflict with the interests of other forums.106 Society generally wants to 
encourage the kind of political discussion that formed the basis of the tort claim in 
New York Times, and that interest may outweigh a particular jurisdiction’s interest 
in regulating it.107  
                                                 
101 Id. at 657.  
102 Stein, supra note 55, at 421.  
103 Id. at 422.  
104 Id. 
105 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court introduced First Amendment considerations to libel cases in  
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, by raising the standard of fault required to “actual malice” when the 
subject of the defamatory statement is a public figure. Id. The plaintiff in Sullivan was the Montgomery 
Alabama Public Safety Commissioner. Id. He claimed an advertisement taken out by civil rights activists 
that described actions taken against civil rights workers by police defamed him, even though he was not 
individually named in the advertisement. Id.  
106 Stein, supra note 55, at 422.  
107 Id.  
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Wille also finds a regulatory basis for states asserting jurisdiction to be 
proper and argues for a framework in which a state’s regulatory interest in 
particular conduct would be determinative.108  “A defendant who engages in 
conduct that may be regulated by a sovereign has tacitly consented to the 
jurisdiction of that sovereign.”109 Because states have a regulatory interest in the 
function of the World Wide Web and because of the way in which computers 
accessing the web function – sending data back and forth – this scheme would 
find that posting something defamatory about another on the Internet is adequate 
contact for exercise of jurisdiction.110 “A state where the contents of a Web page 
proximately cause damage may exercise personal jurisdiction over the owner of 
the Web page no matter whether the recipient or a third party is injured by the 
communication.”111 
Creating a separate jurisdictional analysis for intentional torts should be 
avoided, according to Floyd and Baradaran-Robison, because that approach 
creates difficulty determining which standard to use when a case involves 
multiple different types of claims.112 They find common ground in Burger King’s 
purposeful availment test and Calder’s effects test in that both focus on the 
defendant’s conduct.113 That common element – focus on the defendant’s conduct 
                                                 
108 Wille, supra note 55, at 120.  
109 Id.  
110 Id. at 176.  
111 Id.  
112 Floyd and Baradaran-Robison, supra note 55, at 626.  
113 Id. at 627 
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– forms the basis for their suggestion that the personal jurisdiction standard 
should consider the defendant’s specific conduct and whether there is a specific 
notice based on geography that should make the defendant aware he or she is 
subjecting himself or herself to jurisdiction in a particular forum.114 
Geist’s targeting approach also focuses on the defendant’s conduct by 
making “actual or implied knowledge” of the plaintiff’s residence one of three 
factors a court should consider in determining whether conduct is aimed at a 
specific jurisdiction.115 Relying on Calder for the foundation of the knowledge 
factor, Geist argues that when a defendant knows her conduct will cause some 
action or reaction in a particular forum, then the balance should weigh in favor of 
jurisdiction there.116  
Punger similarly places a great deal of weight on the defendant’s 
knowledge of locale as a guiding factor in finding jurisdiction.117 Instead of 
focusing on the effects test from Calder, Punger argues that the case provides a 
set of three “factors” that should be determinative of jurisdiction: 1) publication 
medium; 2) knowledge of the plaintiff’s state of residence and work; and 3) 
intentional nature of the defendant’s actions.118 This approach grossly extends 
Calder’s reach. The nature of the medium in Calder – a newspaper – was far less 
                                                 
114 Id. at 628.  
115 Geist, supra note 55, at 1402. The other two factors are the presence or absence of a contract 
and the type of technology being utilized.  
116 Id. at 1403.  
117 Punger, supra note 55, at 1965-66.  
118 Id. at 1966 
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important to the court than the size of its circulation in the forum – 600,000 copies 
– and the defendants’ knowledge that it would reach a large audience there.  The 
Calder Court discussed those factors because they were directly relevant to 
understanding where the “brunt of the harm” would be felt.  
Special Rules for Jurisdiction and the Internet?  
A number of commentators have questioned whether the Internet, because of its 
unique nature as a communication tool, calls for a separate set of jurisdictional rules. 
Redish suggests that an exception to “purposeful” availment analysis would be 
appropriate for Internet cases and urges the Court to develop a system focused on 
procedural fairness instead.119 Redish’s test would have two factors, inversely correlated: 
“The stronger the state interest in asserting jurisdiction, the greater the procedural 
burdens on the out-of-state defendant the court should be willing to tolerate.”120 Redish 
does not expound on how this formula would apply in Internet defamation cases, but the 
question would essentially involve weighing the state’s interest in granting a forum for its 
residents. The only burdens on the defendant the test considers are procedural. Thus in 
the case of Internet defamation, it may not leave room for consideration of the 
defendant’s constitutional speech rights.  
Jansen argues for the creation of an “Interactive Web site Test” that would 
combine the effects test, the concept of targeting and Zippo’s sliding scale into a single 
framework.121 This test would first apply the sliding scale to the website’s level of 
                                                 
119 Redish, supra note 55, at 607.  
120 Id. at 609.  
121 Jansen, supra note 55, at 201.  
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interactivity and the relationship between those interactive features and the claim 
alleged.122 If there is no interactivity, then a “traditional effects analysis” would be 
conducted “requiring the plaintiff to clearly show both express aiming and a focal point 
for the injury.”123 If the website is interactive, the court should then analyze whether the 
contacts that derive from that interactivity are also related to the basis for the claim.124 If 
they’re connected, there is jurisdiction, but if there’s no relation between the interactivity 
and the claim, then the court should revert to an effects analysis. In Jansen’s test, 
interactivity functions to lower the threshold if the claim is related to the interactivity. In 
all other situations, courts would rely on an effects and express aiming analysis.125 
Similarly, Geist calls for an Internet-specific jurisdictional analysis.126 He stresses 
the importance of the standard being “technology neutral” – within Internet uses – so that 
it can withstand expansion and changes in Internet use and access, but the application of 
his targeting analysis calls for its use when claims arise out of Internet-based 
communications.127 
In contrast, Floyd and Baradaran-Robison suggest a “unified and objective test for 
personal jurisdiction based on the geographically specific scope that the defendant should 
ascribe to the impact” of his activities that would apply equally to online and offline 
                                                 
122 Id.  
123 Id.  
124 Id.  
125 Id.  
126 Geist, supra note 55, at 1404.  
127 Id.  
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activity.128  Floyd and Baradaran-Robison argue that the Court should turn from a focus 
on the defendant’s intent to his objective awareness.129 Is the defendant aware of the 
types of claims to which he might be subjected, of the jurisdictions he might be haled into 
and of who might be a plaintiff against him?130 Creating a special jurisdictional standard 
for the Internet would strain the meaning of the existing tests and would further muddy 
the already cloudy waters of jurisdictional analysis, Floyd and Baradaran-Robison 
argue.131  
Lastly, Yokoyama contends that a single test for Internet jurisdiction is 
inappropriate because of the wide variety of conduct that can occur on the Internet and 
the Court’s apparent acceptance already of a special standard for intentional torts.132 He  
argues that the existing framework from Calder and Keeton for defamation cases can be 
used adequately on the Internet.133 “The website, for defamation purposes, can 
legitimately be analogized with traditional means of communication, such as the print 
media, radio and television.”134 This argument struggles to gain traction, though, when 
one starts comparing the structure and use of those traditional media against the Internet. 
A newspaper publisher knows how many copies of his or her paper are mailed to another 
state. A radio or television broadcaster has a reliable estimate of how many people in 
                                                 
128 Floyd and Baradaran-Robison, supra note 55, at 626.  
129 Id. at 633.  
130 Id.  
131 Id. at 657 
132 Yokoyama, supra note 55, at 1176. 
133 Id.  
134 Id.  
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another state are tuning in. But an Internet speaker generally has little idea how many 
people in a given jurisdiction are going to see his or her content. The number of 
subscribers that the National Enquirer and Hustler magazine had in California and New 
Hampshire, respectively, were important factors in the Court finding jurisdiction in both 
Calder and Keeton.  
The literature shows a need for the Supreme Court to review its personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence, particularly as it relates to the Internet and intentional torts, in 
order to provide Internet users adequate warning of when they are subjecting themselves 
to jurisdiction in another forum. The literature indicates a great deal of research into the 
intersection of jurisdiction and technology – particularly the Internet – and to a lesser 
extent the intersection of the Internet and jurisdiction in defamation cases. There has been 
no exhaustive review of jurisdiction decisions in Internet defamation cases.  
 
Research Questions  
The goal of this thesis is to determine how state and federal appellate courts have 
approached jurisdiction issues in Internet defamation cases. To accomplish this, the 
following research questions are addressed: 
1) Did courts utilize the Calder effects test? If so, how did they apply it? Was it 
the sole standard used to determine jurisdiction? If they did not use the Calder 
effects test, did they acknowledge it and/or explain their decisions to use a 
different standard? 
 
2) Did courts utilize the Zippo sliding scale test? If so, how did they apply it? Was 
it the sole standard used to determine jurisdiction? If they did not use the Zippo 
test, did they acknowledge it and/or explain their decisions to use a different 
standard?  
 
3) Did courts give any consideration to First Amendment speech protections in 
deciding jurisdiction issues?  
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Methodology 
Cases from state and federal appellate courts involving defamation claims arising 
out of Internet content were reviewed. To identify the relevant cases, searches were 
conducted in the LexisNexis “Federal & State Cases, Combined” database, which 
includes all state and federal appellate courts in the United States. The following search 
terms were used to identify relevant cases “‘personal jurisdiction’ & Internet & defam! 
OR libel OR slander” Additionally, the search was limited to the years 1997-2010. The 
search began with 1997 because that is the year the Zippo decision was issued, 
introducing the sliding scale of interactivity and influencing a number of courts’ 
jurisdiction analyses. A search of those terms identified a universe of 721 cases. Once 
trial court decisions and non-relevant cases were eliminated, the result was 35 cases 
involving jurisdiction issues in Internet defamation claims. Non-relevant cases were those 
in which the jurisdiction question was not decided on due process grounds by the 
appellate court or those that did not contain a defamation claim based on Internet 
communication.  Additionally, while reading the 35 identified cases, citations were 
checked against the identified case list to double-check the list for any missing cases. The 
cases were also Shepardized to make sure they are still good case law as well as identify 
any potentially missing cases.  
Outline 
The first chapter of this thesis consists of a review of relevant literature, research 
questions and method. The second chapter outlines the development of Supreme Court 
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personal jurisdiction doctrine prior to the creation of the Zippo test.  The third chapter 
reviews and analyzes how appellate courts between 1997 and 2010 utilized the Calder 
effects test. The fourth chapter reviews and analyzes how appellate courts used, rejected 
or ignored the Zippo sliding scale between 1997 and 2010.  The fifth chapter analyzes 
cases decided on grounds other than Zippo or Calder,  analyzes how courts treated First 
Amendment protection arguments, if at all, in the jurisdictional analysis and argues for 
consideration of free speech principles in Internet defamation cases.   
 
  
 
Chapter 2 
The Supreme Court’s Development of Personal Jurisdiction 
At the start of every court case there is a basic question to be asked: Does this 
court have the authority to hear this case? Or to put it the way a lawyer might: Does this 
court have jurisdiction? The answer could be based on subject matter; it could be based 
on a statute; or it could flow from the type of court. It could be determined based on who 
the parties are, where they live and what activities they’ve participated in. The latter 
criteria are the basis for “personal jurisdiction,” a body of law that is both convoluted and 
complex, with roots in the common law and modern day moorings in the Constitution. 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines personal jurisdiction as: “A court’s power to bring a 
person into its adjudicative process; jurisdiction over a defendant’s personal rights, rather 
than merely over property interests.”1 It is the authority a court holds, or in some cases 
lacks, to exert power over an individual. And at the start of every case, the court should 
consider whether it has personal jurisdiction over the parties in front of it.  
This chapter will address the development of personal jurisdiction in three parts. 
The first part will be a brief overview of the Supreme Court’s early jurisdiction cases. 
The second part will discuss Pennoyer v. Neff,2 in which the Court incorporated common 
law territorial principles into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It 
                                                 
1 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 870 (8th ed. 2004).  
2 95 U.S. 714 (1877) 
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will also provide a brief overview of some of the cases that followed. The third part will 
discuss modern jurisdictional rules following the Court’s re-structuring of the law in 
International Shoe v. Washington3 into a “minimum contacts” analysis.4 This final 
section will pay particular attention to Calder v. Jones,5 which created the “effects” test 
that is central in many defamation cases. This historical overview provides the context 
and background needed to understand the current state of confusion involving personal 
jurisdiction doctrine in Internet defamation cases.  
Pre-Due Process: When Jurisdiction Rules Were Rooted in Common Law 
In American legal education, civil procedure courses often begin the jurisdiction 
discussion with Pennoyer v. Neff,6 an 1877 case that constitutionalized jurisdiction law. 
But the Supreme Court handled a number of cases prior to Pennoyer that dealt with 
jurisdiction-related issues.7 This section briefly discusses some of the most illustrative of 
                                                 
3  326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
4 Id. at 316.  
5 465 U.S. 783, 790-91(1984). 
6 95 U.S. 714 (1877).  
7 See, e.g., Creighton v. Kerr, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 8 (1873); Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 
Wall.) 457 (1873); Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350 (1873); Crapo v. Kelly, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 610 
(1872); Tyler v. Defrees, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 331 (1870); Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308 
(1870); Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290 (1866); Harvey v. Tyler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 328 (1864); 
Miller v. Sherry, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 237 (1864); Nations v. Johnson, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 195 (1860); Jeter v. 
Hewitt, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 352 (1859); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855); Harris 
v. Hardeman, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 334 (1852); Sargeant v. State Bank of Ind., 53 U.S. (12 How.) 371 (1851); 
D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850); Boswell’s Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 336 
(1850); Williamson v. Berry, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 495 (1850); Lessee of Grignon v. Astor, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 
319 (1844); M’Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839); Voorhees v. Jackson, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 449 
(1836); Elliott v. Lessee Perisol, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328 (1828); Mayhew v. Thatcher, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 129 
(1821); Hampton v. M’Connel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234 (1818); Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 
(1813).  
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those cases, as identified by Dean Borchers,8 and their significance in the development of 
jurisdiction rules in the United States Supreme Court. The Court’s first foray into 
jurisdiction came in Mills v. Duryee,9 a case requiring interpretation of the Full Faith and 
Credit Act of 1790,10 in which the Court found that a judgment in one state should have a 
“conclusive effect” on the judgments of other states.11 The plaintiff in Mills won a 
judgment in New York state court and attempted to enforce the judgment in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia.12 The defendant contested the New 
York judgment in the district court by pleading nil debet,13 which is a general denial in a 
debt action on a simple contract.14 By upholding the judgment in Mills, the Court 
implicitly found that the New York court had jurisdiction over the defendant and he could 
not plead nil debet on a collateral attack when the judgment was being enforced in 
another forum. Mills is perhaps most notable for Justice Johnson’s dissent, in which he 
argued that Congress had not intended to undercut collateral attack when a judgment was 
                                                 
8 Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From 
Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 25-43 (1990).  
9 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813).  
10 Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122, as amended by Act of March 27, 1804, ch. 56, 2 Stat. 
298 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2010)).  
11 Mills, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 485.  
12 Id.  
 
13 Id.  
 
14 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1071 (8th ed. 2004).  
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entered by a court that had no jurisdiction over a party.15 Johnson’s dissent would begin 
to gain traction in an intrastate collateral attack case, Elliott v. Lessee of Peirsol,16 a few 
years later when the Court allowed such a defense on jurisdictional grounds. It then 
became the clear majority view in D’Arcy v. Ketchum,17 an 1850 case in which 
defendants were multiple out-of-state debtors and plaintiffs were the holders of their 
notes who lived in New York.18 One of the defendants appeared in New York court, but 
then he subsequently defaulted.19 The plaintiffs attempted to enforce the judgment against 
another of the defendants in Louisiana.20 The Court adopted the notion that Justice 
Johnson had argued in Mills: neither the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution 
nor the Full Faith and Credit Act of 1790 precluded a collateral attack for lack of 
jurisdiction.21 
                                                 
15 Mills, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 485-86 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Justice Johnson wrote: 
There are certain eternal principles of justice which never ought to be dispensed 
with, and which Courts of justice never can dispense with but when compelled 
by positive statute. One of those is, that jurisdiction cannot be justly exercised 
by a state over property not within the reach of its process, or over persons not 
owing them allegiance or not subjected to their jurisdiction by being found 
within their limits. But if the states are at liberty to pass the most absurd laws on 
this subject, and we admit of a course of pleading which puts it out of our power 
to prevent the execution of judgments obtained under those laws, certainly an 
effect will be given to that article of the constitution in direct hostility with the 
object of it.  
Id. at 486-87. 
16 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328, 341 (1828).  
17 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850).  
18 Id.  
19 Id. at 173. 
20 Id.  
21 Id. at 174.  
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In Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French,22 the Court adopted the principle that a 
company could consent to jurisdiction in another state by its actions there.23 An Indiana 
corporation was doing business in Ohio, and Ohio had a statute that declared any agent of 
an out-of-state corporation to be the company’s agent for service of process.24 The Court 
upheld the Ohio statute and found that the Indiana company had “consented” to 
jurisdiction in Ohio as a condition of doing business there,25 which appears to be a 
precursor to the Court’s later understanding of purposeful availment. 
The last pre-Pennoyer case that Borchers identified as significant is Galpin v. 
Page,26 which involved an intrastate collateral attack on a judgment.27 In the underlying 
case, the plaintiff served constructive notice on an out-of-state infant defendant by 
publication in a California newspaper.28 When the defendant defaulted without making an 
appearance, the plaintiff took possession of property in California.29 When the 
defendant’s representatives discovered what happened, a suit was filed in California to 
attack the judgment and eject the plaintiff.30 The Court held that to properly assert 
                                                 
22 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855).  
23 Id.  
24 Id.  
25 Id. at 407.  
26 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350 (1873).  
27 Id. at 365. Although the defendant was an out-of-state infant, because the property attached to 
enforce the judgment was in the forum, the collateral attack became intrastate. The infant had to come to 
California to attack the judgment.  
28 Id. at 355. 
29 Id.  
30 Id. at 356. 
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jurisdiction over a person, the person had to be served within the state or appear 
voluntarily.31 These early jurisdiction rules were not based on the Constitution but on a 
mix of common law views of territorial principles, as well as state and federal statutes.32  
Pennoyer: Reframing Jurisdiction with Due Process 
The Supreme Court turned personal jurisdiction into a constitutional issue with 
Pennoyer v. Neff33 in 1878 by finding the basis for jurisdiction in the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.34  Pennoyer involved the validity of a default judgment in 
an Oregon state court against a non-resident,35 and it had some striking resemblances to 
Galpin. The non-resident, Neff, had not been served in Oregon and had not appeared in 
the case, but he owned land in Oregon. The plaintiff – an attorney who claimed Neff 
owed him for services – gave constructive notice via publication in an Oregon 
newspaper.36 After winning a judgment, the attorney attached Neff’s Oregon land, which 
was sold in a sheriff’s sale.37 When Neff returned to Oregon, he filed a suit in federal 
district court against Pennoyer, who had purchased the land, to eject him from the 
property and also attack the earlier judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.38  
                                                 
31 Id. at 365-66. 
32 See Borchers, supra note 9, at 25-43.  
33 95 U.S. 714 (1878).  
34 Id.  
35 Id. 
36 Id.  
37 Id.  
38 Id.  
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The district court found in favor of Neff, and Pennoyer appealed to the Supreme 
Court, where the question became whether Oregon had properly exerted jurisdiction over 
Neff when he had not had practical notice of the action against him. The Court explained 
the limits of personal jurisdiction in the context of physical territory:  
The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial 
limits of the State in which it is established. Any attempt to exercise 
authority beyond those limits would be deemed in every other forum, as 
has been said by this court, an illegitimate assumption of power, and be 
resisted as mere abuse.39 
 
This limitation did not preclude the exercise of authority over non-residents who are not 
present in the forum. In fact, it recognized for the first time that a state court has the 
ability to protect the rights and property of state residents by exerting control over non-
residents and their property.40  It also found, for the first time, a home for personal 
jurisdiction in the Constitution.  
The Pennoyer Court did not explain how the Due Process Clause formed the 
foundation for personal jurisdiction.41 Rather, Justice Field gave a dissertation on the 
common law concepts of in rem and in personam jurisdiction.42 In rem jurisdiction is 
                                                 
39 Id. at 720.  
40 Id. at 735. 
41 Id.  
42 Id. at 722-35. Justice Field favorably quoted Justice McLean’s majority opinion in Boswell’s 
Lessee v. Otis in explaining the two:  
“Jurisdiction is acquired in one of two modes: first, as against the person of the 
defendant by the service of process; or, secondly, by a procedure against the 
property of the defendant within the jurisdiction of the court. In the latter case, 
the defendant is not personally bound by the judgment beyond the property in 
question. And it is immaterial whether the proceeding against the property be by 
an attachment or bill in chancery. It must be substantially a proceeding in rem.” 
Id. at 724 (quoting Boswell’s Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 336 (1850)).  
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appropriate when a court has jurisdiction over property in the forum, and it can only be 
exerted to the value of the property.43 To put it simply, if a defendant owns a piece of 
land in the forum, a court can exert in rem jurisdiction but cannot award a judgment in 
excess of the value of the land. In Pennoyer, the Court announced a limitation on in rem 
jurisdiction that the property must be attached at the start of the proceeding.44 This rule 
was meant to avoid the situation of having a judgment become valid because of discovery 
of property after the proceedings began.45 
In personam jurisdiction is derived from the court’s authority over the person.46 A 
court has jurisdiction over a person who is present in the forum.47 In Pennoyer, the Court 
held that in personam jurisdiction could only be exerted if the person was served in the 
forum or if he voluntarily appeared.48 These were the same territorial principles on which 
the earlier cases dealing with collateral attacks in subsequent forums had been decided, 
                                                 
43 Id. at 722  
44 Id. at 728. (The court’s “jurisdiction . . . cannot be made to depend upon facts to be ascertained 
after it has tried the cause and rendered the judgment. If the judgment be previously void, it will not 
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it. The judgment, if void when rendered, will always remain void: it cannot occupy the doubtful position of 
being valid if property be found, and void if there be none.”)  
45 Id.  
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47 Id.  
48 Id. at 726-27. Justice Field wrote:  
If, without personal service, judgments in personam, obtained ex parte against 
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the evidence of the transactions upon which they were founded, if they ever had 
any existence, had perished.  
Id.  
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but now they were being applied to a collateral attack within the same forum where the 
original judgment had been issued.49  
Pennoyer also declared that substituted service – such as by publication – could 
only be effective on non-residents for in rem jurisdiction cases when the property was 
attached at the outset.50 The idea was that attachment of the property would be sufficient 
to serve notice since property is presumed to be “in the possession of its owner.”51 
Because the plaintiff in the underlying action had not attached Neff’s property at the 
outset of the case, under the Supreme Court’s newly announced jurisdiction regime, 
jurisdiction was improper.52  Substituted service would never be proper in an in personam 
case over an out-of-state defendant.53 
A particular oddity of Pennoyer is its timing problem.54 The underlying action in 
Pennoyer — the default judgment against Neff — occurred in 1866, two years before the 
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.55 Borchers asks, “If the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment 
was a crucial element in invalidating the underlying judgment, and the opinion certainly 
suggested that this was so, how could it have acted retroactively?”56 Yet the Court never 
                                                 
49 See Borchers, supra note 9, at 31.  
50 Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 727.  
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52 Id.  
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54 See Borchers, supra note 9, at 37.  
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56 Id.  
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explained this apparent anomaly, and many commenters have referred to it as “dictum” 
even though the Due Process Clause is treated in the opinion as an essential element.57  
For nearly 70 years the Court continued to apply these territorial principles in 
jurisdiction cases, making refinements while failing to offer clear guidance. “Pennoyer 
left the matter of whether there was a general constitutional limitation on the reach of 
state courts in splendid ambiguity,” according to Borchers.58 The early cases took a 
limited view of Pennoyer as only providing an avenue for challenge of a state’s 
jurisdiction instead of dictating the rules of jurisdiction.59   
Between 1906 and 1915, the Court shifted to a more expansive view of Pennoyer 
as “mean[ing] to render unconstitutional any state court assertion of personal jurisdiction 
beyond the territorial principles and allow a defendant to attack the judgment either 
intrastate or interstate.”60 By the time the Court heard Riverside & Dan River Cotton 
Mills v. Menefee61 in 1915, this view had gained considerable ground. In Menefee a 
member of the board of directors of a Virginia company was served at his home in North 
Carolina.62 North Carolina’s jurisdictional rules allowed service of process on a director 
to confer jurisdiction on an out-of-state corporation, and the state courts upheld 
                                                 
57 Id. at 38.  
58 Id. at 43.  
59 See, e.g., Hart v. Sansom, 110 U.S. 151 (1884) (holding that constructive service on an out-of-
state defendant was not adequate); Insurance Co. v. Bangs, 103 U.S. 435 (1880) (holding that state courts 
could formulate jurisdictional rules, including substituted service in in personam cases).  
60 See Borchers, supra note 9, at 39.  
61 237 U.S. 189 (1915).  
62 Id. at 190.  
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jurisdiction.63 The Supreme Court made clear that an expansive view of Pennoyer was 
now the rule when it struck down jurisdiction, despite the North Carolina courts having 
complied with North Carolina rules regarding out-of-state defendants.64 
The notion of consent, which had been seen first in Lafayette Insurance Co.,65 re-
emerged in Kane v. New Jersey,66 as “implied consent.” New Jersey was in the practice 
of requiring out-of-state drivers to sign forms consenting to jurisdiction at the state line 
before being permitted to drive in the state, which the Supreme Court upheld.67 In Hess v. 
Pawkloski,68 the Court extended the consent doctrine to include driving in Massachusetts 
– without signing a form – which was sufficient under that state’s law.69  These consent 
cases, rooted in the territorial principles of Pennoyer, set the stage for a dramatic 
remaking of jurisdiction doctrine.  
Minimum Contacts: International Shoe and Beyond 
In International Shoe v. Washington,70 the Court began a long process of 
reframing personal jurisdiction by focusing on the contacts a defendant has with a 
forum and the degree of “presence.”71  The case arose out of a dispute between a 
                                                 
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 191-92 
65 Lafayette Insurance Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855).  
66 242 U.S. 160 (1919).  
67 Id.  
68 274 U.S. 352 (1927).  
69 Id.  
70 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
71 Id. at 315.  
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Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Mo., and the 
state of Washington.72 Washington had a law requiring companies that operated in the 
state to contribute to an unemployment compensation fund.73 The state was 
attempting to collect from International Shoe Company and filed suit in state court.74 
It then served one of International Shoe’s salesmen who worked in Washington and 
mailed a copy to the company’s registered agent in Missouri.75 The company 
appeared in the Washington proceedings, challenged the service as improper and 
argued that it was not a Washington company doing business within the state.76 
The company had no offices or manufacturing facilities in the state.77 For a 
limited period of time it had employed about one dozen traveling salesmen who lived 
in Washington and had little authority to do more than transmit orders back to St. 
Louis.78 The salesmen only carried samples with them and did not have inventory to 
sell,79 and they had no authority to enter into any contracts on behalf of the 
company.80  
                                                 
72 Id. at 311-12.  
73 Id. at 311.  
74 Id. at 312.  
75 Id. at 313. 
76 Id. at 313. 
77 Id.  
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79 Id.  
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The question before the Court was whether service of a salesman in such 
circumstances was adequate under in personam principles to assert jurisdiction over 
the corporation. Since corporations are a legal fiction, the Court began to focus on 
what corporate “presence” means.81 The International Shoe Court called for an 
inquiry into whether the defendant “has certain minimum contacts with the [forum 
state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.’”82 The court weighed such factors as whether the 
corporation had “systematic and continuous” activities within the state and whether it 
conducted activities to such an extent that it “enjoys the benefits and protection of the 
laws of that state” in determining that Washington did have jurisdiction over 
International Shoe.83  
The Court’s next foray into jurisdiction did not deal with minimum contacts 
but is notable for its treatment of in personam and in rem jurisdiction.  In Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust,84 the Court called them “elusive and confused” and 
signaled the end for both as the basis of jurisdiction. Instead two new concepts rooted 
in International Shoe began to emerge: specific personal jurisdiction and general 
jurisdiction.  The concept that would later be known as “specific personal 
jurisdiction” was first described in Travelers Health Association v. Virginia,85 a case 
in which the Court held that the connection between the insurance company’s 
                                                 
81 Id. at 317.  
82 Id. at 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).  
83 Id. at 319-20. 
84 339 U.S. 306 (1950).  
85 339 U.S. 643 (1950).  
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contacts with Virginia and the state’s interest in regulating insurance were adequate to 
create jurisdiction.86  
General jurisdiction emerged in Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining 
Co.87 where the Court found that Ohio had jurisdiction over a foreign corporation 
with a base in Ohio for all intents and purposes.88 The company’s operations were 
primarily in the Philippines, but its headquarters had moved to Ohio during World 
War II because of the Japanese invasion of the islands.89 The Court evaluated the 
company’s “continuous and systematic corporate activities” in Ohio and found them 
sufficient to make it fair and reasonable to subject the company to jurisdiction there.90 
The Introduction of Purposeful Availment 
The Court began, in earnest, its refinement of the minimum contacts test in 
Hanson v. Denckla.91  In Hanson the defendant was a Delaware trust company that 
was trying to avoid jurisdiction in Florida. It had never solicited any clients there, and 
its only contacts were with a trust settlor who had moved from Pennsylvania to 
Florida after the trust had been established.92 Because the trust company’s only 
contacts with Florida were the result of the settlor’s unilateral decision to move there, 
the Court found that company had not “purposefully avail[ed]” itself of the laws of 
                                                 
86 Id. at 648.  
87 342 U.S. 437 (1952).  
88 Id. at 445.  
89 Id. at 445-48.  
90 Id. at 445.  
91 357 U.S. 235 (1958).  
92 Id. at 253. 
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Florida and should not have to go to court there: “[I]t is essential in each case that 
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and 
protections of its laws.”93  Hanson thereby introduced “purposeful availment” into the 
minimum contacts equation.  
Personal jurisdiction stayed out of the Court’s crosshairs for nearly 20 years 
before it stepped back into the line of fire with Shaffer v. Heitner.94 Shaffer focused 
on a holdover from Pennoyer called quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. With in rem 
jurisdiction the property creating jurisdiction is also the object of the action. With 
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction the property is somehow related but not the focus of the 
action. Shaffer was a quasi-in-rem case that started as a shareholder derivative lawsuit 
in Delaware against a Delaware corporation and 28 members of the company’s board 
of directors.95 The plaintiff sought an order barring the sale of stock held by the 
directors, most of whom were not Delaware residents, since under state law the stock 
of Delaware corporations is “located” in the state.96 The Shaffer Court found that 
Delaware’s exertion of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction could not be justified unless the 
defendants met the same minimum contacts test required for other forms of 
jurisdiction,97 essentially merging the concept of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction with 
personal jurisdiction in practice. 
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That refinement of the minimum contacts test continued with World-Wide 
Volkswagen v. Woodson in 1980.98 The Supreme Court explained that International 
Shoe’s minimum contacts requirement has two functions.99 The first is protecting a 
defendant from having to go to court in a “distant or inconvenient forum.”100 The 
second is protecting federalism by preventing states from “reach[ing] out beyond the 
limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.”101 
Citing Hanson,102 the Court explained that the question wasn’t whether the defendant 
could foresee any contact with a particular forum but whether “the defendant’s 
conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably 
anticipate being haled into court there.”103 It also stated that the foreseeability test is 
met when a corporation “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum State.”104   
Calder v. Jones: Creation of the “Effects” Test  
The Court then took an unexplained turn in its jurisdiction analysis in a 
defamation case over an article published in the National Enquirer. In Calder v. 
                                                 
98 444 U.S. 286 (1980) World-Wide Volkswagen involved claims against a German car 
manufacturer’s American subsidiary and a dealership, both based in New York. The plaintiff filed suit in 
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99 Id. at 292.  
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Jones,105 which followed World-Wide Volkswagen by only four years, the question of 
purposeful availment was never broached.106 Instead the Court focused on the 
defendants’ — both Florida residents — knowledge that the article would cause the 
“brunt of the harm” to the plaintiff in California.107  Rather than apply the purposeful 
availment standard the Court had developed in its previous jurisdiction cases, it 
crafted a new standard under which jurisdiction can be asserted if the plaintiff can 
show that the forum state was both the focal point of the act and the place where the 
harm was suffered.108 The court also introduced “express aiming” into the analysis of 
whether the defendants’ conduct was targeting the forum state: 
[P]etitioners are not charged with mere untargeted negligence. Rather, 
their intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at 
California. Petitioner South wrote and petitioner Calder edited an article 
that they knew would have a potentially devastating impact upon 
respondent. And they knew that the brunt of that injury would be felt by 
respondent in the state in which she lives and works and in which the 
National Enquirer has its largest circulation. Under the circumstances, 
petitioners must “reasonably anticipate being haled into court there” to 
answer for the truth of the statements made in their article.109  
 
The Court did conduct a minimum contacts analysis in Keeton v. Hustler 
Magazine, a companion case to Calder that also involved a defamation claim.110 In 
                                                 
105 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
106 Redish describes this as “depart[ing] dramatically from the logic of the purposeful availment 
standard.” Martin H. Redish, Of New Wine and Old Bottles: Personal Jurisdiction, the Internet and the 
Nature of Constitutional Evolution, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 575, 584 (1998).  
107 Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. The defendants in Calder included a reporter and editor, being sued as 
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had made some phone calls and at least one trip to California to report the story. The editor had no contacts 
with California that were directly related to publication of the article.  
108 Id. at 788-89. 
109 Id. at 789-90 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen v.  Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980)).  
110 465 U.S. 770 (1984).  
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Keeton, the Court found the magazine’s monthly circulation of 10,000 to 15,000 
copies in the forum state, New Hampshire, was adequate to meet the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment’s minimum contacts requirements. “Such 
regular monthly sales of thousands of magazines cannot by any stretch of the 
imagination be characterized as random, isolated, or fortuitous.”111  
The primary factual difference between Keeton and Calder was the identity of 
the defendants seeking to escape another state’s jurisdiction. In Keeton the defendant 
was the corporation that published the magazine while in Calder the defendants were 
the reporter and editor who prepared the allegedly defamatory story for publication.  
Yet the Court’s ruling in Keeton is more in tune with the World-Wide Volkswagen 
line of cases than Calder because it focuses on whether Hustler magazine 
purposefully availed itself of the laws of New Hampshire by circulating more than 
10,000 copies there.112 The Calder defendants likened themselves to the welders on a 
boiler in Florida that later exploded in California and argued that they shouldn’t 
individually be subject to jurisdiction since they did not control where the article 
would end up.113 The Court flatly rejected this foreseeability argument on the grounds 
that the defendants knew the actress-plaintiff lived and worked in California and that 
the newspaper had a large circulation there.114 
Another important element of Calder is how the Court treated the argument 
that granting jurisdiction in defamation cases before conducting a First Amendment 
                                                 
111 Id. at 774.  
112 Id.  
113 Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. 
114 Id. at 790.  
45 
 
analysis has a potentially chilling effect on speech. In dictum, the Court flatly rejected 
a call for First Amendment analysis at the jurisdiction stage:115  
The infusion of such considerations would needlessly complicate 
an already imprecise inquiry. Moreover, the potential chill on 
protected First Amendment activity stemming from libel and 
defamation cases is already taken into account in the constitutional 
limitations on the substantive law governing such suits. To 
reintroduce those concerns at the jurisdictional stage would be a 
form of double counting.116 
 
Because Calder involved a defamation case in which the authors of an 
allegedly defamatory article had few physical or business contacts with the forum, it 
will become particularly important in Internet defamation cases.117 While some 
commenters have looked approvingly on the use of Calder’s effects test in intentional 
tort cases,118 others have considered it to be too limiting,119 and it has resulted in a 
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116 Id. at 790 (citations omitted, emphasis in original). 
117 See generally Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2010) (relying on Calder to find 
jurisdiction in an Internet defamation case); Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(reformulating Calder into a targeting test); Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002) (relying partially 
on Calder).   
118 See Rachael T. Krueger, Comment, Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice 
Lost in Cyberspace: Personal Jurisdiction and On-Line Defamatory Statements, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 301, 
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standard should replace the “brunt of the harm” standard that Calder calls for: “Jurisdiction over the 
defendant in a libel case should be proper in plaintiff’s home state when significant harm is felt by the 
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one state. Id. at 431. See also David Wille, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet – Proposed Limits on 
State Jurisdiction over Data Communications in Tort Cases, 87 KY. L.J. 95 (1998). Prof. Wille similarly 
argues for a much more lenient “significant effects” test than the current Calder standard. Id. at 114.  
46 
 
great deal of confusion about when it should be applied.120 Floyd and Baradaran-
Robison in their research found that courts struggle with understanding the 
relationship between Calder and the purposeful availment cases.121 
 
Return to Purposeful Availment 
 The Court returned to the purposeful availment framework in Burger King 
Corp. v. Rudzewicz,122 a contract dispute case between Burger King and its 
franchisees. The Court applied the World-Wide Volkswagen framework but added a 
new wrinkle — directed conduct.123 The Court held that specific jurisdiction could be 
asserted over an out-of-state defendant when the subject had “fair warning” because 
“the defendant has ‘purposefully directed’ his activities at residents of the forum.”124  
It did not make jurisdiction automatic even when a plaintiff could show that a 
defendant engaged in targeted conduct toward a jurisdiction:  
[W]here a defendant who purposefully has directed his activities at forum 
residents seeks to defeat jurisdiction, he must present a compelling case 
that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction 
unreasonable. . . . Nevertheless, minimum requirements inherent in the 
concept of “fair play and substantial justice” may defeat the 
reasonableness of jurisdiction even if the defendant has purposefully 
engaged in forum activities.125 
 
                                                 
120 C. Douglas Floyd & Shima Baradaran-Robison, Toward a Unified Test of Personal 
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The Court’s only acknowledgement of Calder was not for the effects test but as 
support for propositions more directly rooted in Keeton.126  
There is another important piece to the Court’s personal jurisdiction cases that 
should be noted. In one of its most recent jurisdiction decisions, Asahi Metal Industry 
Co. v. Superior Court,127 the Court divided on the question of whether awareness that 
an item placed into the “stream of commerce” could end up in a specific forum 
farther down the line is adequate to establish jurisdiction even if there are no other 
contacts with the forum. Asahi Metal Industry, a Japanese manufacturer of tire valve 
stems, challenged jurisdiction because the company had no California business. It 
sold its parts to a Taiwanese company.128 The Taiwanese company claimed that Asahi 
knew the valve stems would end up in California.129  The justices agreed that 
jurisdiction would be improper because of the burden litigation in California would 
place on the Japanese defendant.130  
Yet, the Court split on the stream of commerce question. In a plurality opinion 
written by Justice O’Connor, four justices found that “mere awareness” a product 
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could end up in a particular forum once it was placed into the stream of commerce 
was inadequate to find purposeful availment.131 “Something more” is required.132  
Four justices found that Asahi’s contacts with California were sufficient to meet the 
purposeful availment standard based on its placing the tire valve stem into the stream 
of commerce and its awareness that the valve stem eventually would end up in 
California.133  Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment but wrote that the purposeful 
availment question did not need to be reached since the justices agreed that exercising 
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation under the Asahi facts would be 
unreasonable.134 It was perhaps significant that the American parties had all settled by 
the time the jurisdictional dispute reached the Supreme Court and all that was left was 
a dispute between two foreign corporations with few ties to California.  
The Court’s next personal jurisdiction case, Burnham v. Superior Court,135 
involved a long-accepted practice known as “tagging” or “transient jurisdiction,” 
which is service of process while a defendant is temporarily in the jurisdiction on an 
unrelated matter, such as on a vacation or even a layover at the airport.136 While the 
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Court unanimously upheld the California court’s assertion of authority137 the 
reasoning was splintered, resulting in a plurality opinion and three concurrences.  
The defendant in Burnham and his wife were in the process of divorcing.138 At 
the time of their separation the couple lived in New Jersey and agreed that the wife 
could take custody of the children and move to California.139 The husband was to file 
for divorce in New Jersey citing “irreconcilable differences,” but after his wife moved 
to California he filed for divorce citing “desertion.”140 At the end of a brief trip to 
California that included a visit with his children, the husband was served with a 
divorce petition filed there by the wife.141  
Justice Scalia announced the Court’s decision and argued that jurisdiction 
over those present in a state is “[a]mong the most firmly rooted principles of personal 
jurisdiction in American tradition.”142 Once such jurisdiction is obtained, it is retained 
even if the person leaves the state.143 Justice Brennan argued the position that while 
the historical acceptance of “transient jurisdiction” is an important factor, an 
“independent inquiry into the . . . fairness of the prevailing in-state service rule” 
                                                 
137 Id. at 606.  
138 Id. at 607.  
139 Id.  
140 Id. at 607-08.  
141 Id. at 608.  
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should be undertaken.144  Justices White145 and Stevens146 each wrote brief 
concurrences, as well. 
Lastly, two personal jurisdiction cases were decided by the Court in 2011, 
marking the first time since Burnham that the justices took up a personal jurisdiction 
case. Neither arose out of an Internet dispute, and both dealt with  “stream of 
commerce” questions left open by Asahi.  In J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. 
Nicastro147 the Court wrestled with the question of whether a foreign corporation 
targeting the United States as a whole with a product is sufficient, consistent with due 
process limits, to create personal jurisdiction in a forum state where the product was 
sold.148 The Court majority adopted Justice O’Connor’s interpretation of Asahi that 
something more than merely placing a product in the stream of commerce was 
required.149 In Goodyear Luxembourg Tires SA v. Brown150 the Court considered 
whether placement of a product into the stream of commerce by other actors, with the 
knowledge of a foreign corporation, should confer general jurisdiction when that 
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product ends up in a particular forum.151  In Brown, the plaintiff’s son had died in a 
bus accident in Paris, France that was caused by a tire failure.152 The plaintiffs sought 
jurisdiction in North Carolina, where the defendants tires were sold with the 
company’s knowledge by third-party distributors.153 The court found the stream of 
commerce doctrine inadequate to confer general jurisdiction.154 Both cases served to 
answer fairly narrow jurisdiction questions that had been left open by Asahi and 
neither is likely to have an effect on defamation claims arising from Internet speech.  
Conclusion  
The Supreme Court’s early jurisdiction cases provide a context for the principles 
that continue to be applied in disputes involving out-of-state defendants. The basic 
territorial principle, while no longer the rule, still informs the decisions of courts that 
choose not to exercise jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants.  Yet it’s also easy to see 
why strict adherence to the rule would not make sense in our modern society. With the 
ease of travel and technological advances that make doing business and communicating 
across territorial boundaries easy, avoiding jurisdiction for actual harms committed 
elsewhere would be simple. In the Internet defamation context, the only available forum 
to a victim would be wherever the defamer lives.  
The cases developed in the minimum contacts era provide the necessary 
framework for understanding lower courts’ decisions in Internet defamation cases. They 
also help highlight why lower courts struggle to choose which standard is most 
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appropriate. The Court has outlined two seemingly irreconcilable standards for 
determining jurisdiction: the purposeful availment line of cases that focuses on the 
defendant’s actual contacts with the forum and the Calder effects test that focuses on the 
defendant’s knowledge of where the plaintiff would feel the brunt of the harm. In 
announcing the latter standard, the Court was not clear on when it should apply, leaving 
open the question of whether it is a defamation-only standard, an intentional tort 
standard, or something else. Because none of these decisions were reached after the 
Internet became an ever-present tool in society, their principles aren’t informed by the 
ways in which modern interactions occur. Thus, determining how to apply those 
principles to Internet interactions has become the task of lower courts and is the focus of 
the following chapters. 
  
 
Chapter 3 
The Application of Calder’s Effects Test to Internet Defamation Cases 
 In Calder v. Jones,1 the U.S. Supreme Court introduced a new formulation for 
minimum contacts in a defamation case.2 Instead of focusing on the physical contacts the 
two defendants had with the forum, the court turned to the defendants’ knowledge that 
their actions would harm the plaintiff – an actress – in California and that she was a 
resident of California:  
[T]hey knew that the brunt of that injury would be felt by respondent in 
the state in which she lives and works and in which the National Enquirer 
has its largest circulation. Under the circumstances, petitioners must 
“reasonably anticipate being haled into court there” to answer for the truth 
of the statements made in their article.”3  
 
The Court did not ignore traditional contacts outright. It noted that the 
publication, the National Enquirer, circulated more copies in California than in 
any other state and that the circulation there was quite large: 600,000.4  
The defendants who were challenging jurisdiction in Calder were the 
individual editor and reporter who had worked on the story.5 Using the pre-Calder 
jurisdiction framework might not have resulted in those two defendants facing 
                                                 
1 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
2 See supra Chapter 2, Part III.  
3 Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen v.  Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 296 (1980)).  
4 Id.  
5 Id. at 785.  
54 
 
jurisdiction in California, though, because they each had limited contacts with the 
state and the defamation claim did not arise out of those contacts.6 So the Court 
announced this new “effects” test that conferred jurisdiction when an intentional, 
tortious act is directed into the forum state and the actors know that the “brunt of 
th[e] injury” will be felt by the victim in the forum.7 
This framework has proved attractive to courts wrestling with jurisdiction 
in Internet defamation cases. Many have considered Calder the appropriate 
guideline because it is a defamation case. Others find it useful in any intentional 
tort situation where an out-of-state act results in harm to a state resident. But 
Calder does not provide clear guidelines for how its express aiming element is to 
be applied. It also does not clarify whether the defendant must only know that the 
plaintiff is a resident of a particular forum and will suffer harm there or whether 
there must also be an intent to target the forum in addition to an intent to target 
the individual who lives there. With that confusion, lower courts have come to 
varying conclusions about how to apply Calder in Internet defamation cases.  
 Calder was discussed in 27 state and federal appellate cases decided between 
1997 and 2010 where jurisdiction in Internet defamation was at issue. Those cases can be 
placed into four broad categories, each of which will be addressed in a different part of 
this chapter. The first part discusses cases in which neither the plaintiff nor the defendant 
is a resident of the forum and the court must consider whether, under the effects test, a 
plaintiff could experience the “brunt of the harm” in that jurisdiction. The second part 
                                                 
6 Id.  
7 Id. at 790.  
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deals with the cases in which courts adopted a narrow view of the “express aiming” and 
knowledge requirements of the effects test, thereby created a relatively high barrier for 
jurisdiction in Internet defamation cases. The cases in the third part are those in which 
courts took a broad view of the express aiming and knowledge requirements, making it 
easier for courts to assert jurisdiction in Internet defamation cases. The fourth part covers 
cases in which courts discussed Calder but declined to apply the effects test. The chapter 
concludes that the narrow view is more appropriate than a broad view because it hews 
more closely to the U.S. Supreme Court’s intent in Calder. 
Out-of-state Plaintiffs and Out-of-state Defendants 
When both the plaintiff and the defendant are non-residents of the forum, courts 
appear reluctant to confer jurisdiction based on an application of the Calder effects test. 
But there is room for an out-of-state plaintiff to show that the brunt of the injury was felt 
in the forum and that the defendant intended to target the forum. The cases involving 
non-resident plaintiffs and defendants include both broad and narrow views of the 
“express aiming” element, but because the plaintiff’s burden of showing the brunt of the 
injury was felt in a state in which he does not reside is considerably heavier, these cases 
have been grouped together.  
In Jewish Defense Organization, Inc. v. Superior Court8 the California Court of 
Appeal relied heavily on the Calder effects test in its determination that it did not have 
jurisdiction over a New York-based defendant. The case was the first of a series brought 
in California courts by New York private investigator Steve Rambam against various 
website owners from places outside California. In Jewish Defense Organization, the 
                                                 
8 72 Cal. App. 4th 1045 (1999).  
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defendants were a New York activist group and its primary leader, Mordechai Levy, who 
had a long history with the investigator.9 Rambam had been hired in 1989 to serve 
process on Levy in New York for a different lawsuit.10 Levy shot at Rambam but missed 
and injured a bystander.11 Levy later created a website that included allegations Rambam 
was a “snitch” and government informant, admired Nazis and was anti-Semitic.12 
Rambam sued in California, arguing that courts there had jurisdiction over Levy because 
a “mirror” of Levy’s website was housed on servers in California.13 A “mirror” site on 
the Internet is one that contains identical content as the main website although it is 
housed in a different location.  
 The court quickly rejected any theories of jurisdiction based on the mirror 
website, which was maintained by a third party who was not a defendant in the case.14 It 
then engaged in a two-part jurisdictional analysis to determine if specific jurisdiction 
existed. First it applied what it called “the case law which has developed in defamation 
cases”15 rooted in Calder v. Jones.16 Then it turned to Internet jurisdiction cases and 
                                                 
9 Id. at 1051-54.  
10 Id. at 1051.  
11 Id.  
12 Id. at 1050.  
13 Id. at 1053. Rambam also claimed that Levy owned property and a business in California. He presented 
public records connected to land and a service station owned by a Mordechai Levy, but the trial court was 
not satisfied these were owned by the same Mordechai Levy as the defendant in this case in part because 
they had different Social Security numbers. Id.  
14 Id.  
15 Id.at 1056.  
16 465 U.S. 783, 790-91(1984); Id. at 1057.  
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applied Zippo Manufacturing Inc. v. Zippo Dot Com.17 How the Jewish Defense 
Organization court applied Zippo will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 4.  
 The California Court of Appeal found that Calder’s effects test could be used to 
satisfy the purposeful availment requirements of due process and then relied on the Ninth 
Circuit’s reformulation of the test in Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen18 as its 
guide.19 “Under Calder, personal jurisdiction can be based upon: (1) intentional actions 
(2) expressly aimed at the forum state (3) causing harm, the brunt of which is suffered—
and which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered—in the forum state.”20 Under this 
formulation of the effects test, which takes a narrow view of the express aiming element, 
the court found it fairly easy to conclude that California did not have jurisdiction because 
Rambam had not shown that he would feel the brunt of the harm there.21  
Rambam, who was not a California resident, had provided evidence that he “spent 
considerable professional time” there but had not shown that he had clients there or 
established that his reputation would be harmed there.22 The court noted that it did not 
need to wade into the discussion among the federal circuit courts about the meaning of 
                                                 
17 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).  
18 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).  
19 Jewish Defense Org., 72 Cal. App. 4th at 1057.  
20 Id.  
21 Id. at 1059.  
22 Id. The court also found jurisdiction lacking under the Zippo standard, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 4, because the website was “passive.” Id. at 1057.  
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the “express aiming” element of Calder because Rambam had not been able to show the 
harm would be felt in California.23 
The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey in Blakey v. 
Continental Airlines24 considered Calder but also relied heavily on its companion case, 
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine.25 In Keeton, the U.S. Supreme Court found personal 
jurisdiction was appropriately exerted in New Hampshire over a magazine with a 
circulation of more than 10,000 copies in the state that had employees whose job was to 
oversee distribution there.26 The Keeton Court performed a purposeful availment analysis 
based on forum contacts, instead of using the just-announced effects test, to find the 
magazine was subject to jurisdiction there.27  The Blakey appellate court noted that in 
both Keeton and Calder there were “continuously and deliberately directed” comments 
into the forum.28 Ultimately, though, the effects test played a greater role in the court’s 
decision. It adopted the trial court’s interpretation of appropriate jurisdiction in Internet 
defamation cases, which was heavily influenced by Calder and contained a narrow view 
of the express aiming element: 
We concur with Judge Fuentes’ synthesis of the current state of the law: 
“The common thread that runs through each of the reported decisions is 
that non-resident defendants may be subject to personal jurisdiction solely 
on the basis of their electronic contacts when they specifically direct their 
                                                 
23 Id. “In the instant case, we need not resolve any conflict among the federal circuits; Rambam has not 
even established that his residence or principal place of business is in California, so the purposeful 
availment prong of the special jurisdiction issue is not satisfied on that ground.” Id.  
24 730 A.2d 854 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999), rev’d,  751 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2000).  
25 465 U.S. 770 (1984). 
26 Id. at 774.  
27 Id.  
28 Blakey, 730 A.2d at 867.  
59 
 
activities at the forum, the plaintiff is a resident of the forum, and the brunt 
of the injury is felt in the forum state.”29  
 
The court found jurisdiction inappropriate because Blakey arose out of comments on a 
limited-access bulletin board operated by Continental Airlines for its employees, neither 
the individual defendants nor the plaintiff — all employees of the airline — were New 
Jersey residents, and there were no systematic or continuous contacts with New Jersey on 
the part of the individuals who made the allegedly defamatory comments.30 The 
plaintiff’s own contacts with New Jersey made assertion of jurisdiction in New Jersey 
over other out-of-state actors too attenuated.  
 The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed by focusing on the facts of the case and 
Calder’s indication that the forum where a plaintiff feels the “brunt of the harm” will 
have jurisdiction if there is targeting of that locale.31 That the plaintiff was a resident of 
Washington state was relevant to whether the “brunt of the harm” would be felt in New 
Jersey, but it was not determinative, the New Jersey Supreme Court wrote.32 The plaintiff 
had filed a sexual harassment case against the airline, and the case was pending in a New 
Jersey federal court when other pilots began commenting about her in the employee 
forum.33 She then filed the subsequent defamation lawsuit against those employees in 
state court.34   
                                                 
29 Id. at 864. 
30 Id. at 867.  
31 Blakely v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2000).  
32 Id. at 556.  
33 Id. at 555.  
34 Id. 
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Because her sexual harassment case was pending in New Jersey when the 
allegedly tortious conduct of the individual defendants began, the court found that 
jurisdiction might be appropriate when applying the effects test.35 “Because defamation 
was alleged to be part of the harassing conduct that took place on the Crew Members 
Forum, it would be fair to posit jurisdiction where the effects of the harassment were 
intended to be felt. The center of gravity of this employment dispute was in Newark, New 
Jersey.”36 The court remanded the case for additional discovery to determine whether the 
individual defendants knew that the plaintiff had a sexual harassment case pending in 
New Jersey.37 By finding it necessary for the trial court to determine whether the 
defendants knew that the harassment case was pending, the court asked the trial court 
implicitly to determine whether the defendants knew that the brunt of the harm caused by 
their online taunts was to be felt in New Jersey.   
 The California Court of Appeal revisited jurisdiction in Internet defamation cases 
in Nam Tai Electronics v. Titzer.38 Neither the plaintiff, Nam Tai Electronics, nor the 
defendant was a California resident.39 The company was incorporated in the British 
Virgin Islands and based in Hong Kong.40 Titzer was a Colorado resident who had posted 
                                                 
35 Id. at 556.  
36 Id.  
37 Id. at 558.  
38 93 Cal. App. 4th 1301 (2001), overruled in part by Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 4th 262 (2002). 
Pavlovich was a trade secrets case in which the court applied the Calder effects test to determine whether 
the state had jurisdiction over a Texas defendant. Pavlovich, 29 Cal. 4th at 266-67.   
39 Nam Tai Elec., 93 Cal. App. 4th at 1305.  
40 Id.  
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numerous messages about Nam Tai on a Yahoo! message board.41 Nam Tai sued in 
California on the theory that jurisdiction was appropriate there because Yahoo! was based 
there and its terms of service with users stated that California law would govern 
disputes.42 The court quickly dispensed with the terms of service argument since the 
agreement is between the user and Yahoo!, not a third-party.43 It then focused on the 
messages to determine whether they provided sufficient minimum contacts to warrant 
jurisdiction.  
Following the same logic it used in Jewish Defense Organization, the court found 
no evidence that the messages were directed at California or that the plaintiff suffered any 
reputational damage there.44 “The determinative question is whether the Web sites 
themselves are of particular significance to California or Californians such that the user 
has reason to know the posting of a message will have significant impact in this state.”45 
The court found the answer to that question was no. 46 
In another case involving Steve Rambam – the plaintiff in Jewish Defense 
Organization – the  California Court of Appeal again analyzed jurisdiction in a claim of 
Internet defamation.47 The case, Rambam (Rambam I) v. Luhta,48 really was based on 
                                                 
41 Id.  
42 Id.  
43 Id. at 1312.  
44 Id. 
45 Id.  
46 Id.  
47 Rambam v. Luhta, 2001 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1143 (2001).  
48 Id.  
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email rather than a publicly accessible website although the court described it as though it 
were a website case and applied the same standards as it had in Jewish Defense 
Organization and Nam Tai Electronics.49 For similar reasons, the Rambam I court, in an 
unpublished decision, found jurisdiction lacking. Neither Rambam nor the defendant, a 
Canadian, was a California resident, and the plaintiff had not shown that the harm would 
be felt there.50 In a third case, Rambam (Rambam II) v. Prytulak,51 another unpublished 
decision involving the same plaintiff and nearly identical facts, the court followed its 
earlier decisions in Rambam I and Jewish Defense Organization. The only significant 
difference between Rambam I and Rambam II was that the latter came up as a collateral 
attack on a default judgment.52 
The California Court of Appeal again dealt with an Internet defamation claim 
involving a foreign defendant in Nygard v. Aller Jukaisut Oy,53 also an unpublished 
decision. The plaintiff in Nygard was a Finnish national who was the chairman of a 
Canada-based fashion company and occasionally spent time at a corporate guest house in 
the Los Angeles area.54 The defendant was a Finnish magazine publisher that also puts 
articles on its website.55 After determining that the publisher did not have enough 
contacts with California for general jurisdiction, the court turned to the specific personal 
                                                 
49 Id. at 1143, *12-19 
50 Id.  
51 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 12 (2004).  
52 Id. 
53 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1375 (2005).  
54 Id. at 1375, *2 
55 Id.  
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jurisdiction question using the Calder effects test.56 Following the same logic it did in 
Nam Tai Electronics, as well as the three cases involving Steve Rambam, the court found 
that jurisdiction in California could not be sustained.57 There was no evidence that 
posting of the allegedly defamatory story – in the Finnish language – was intentionally 
targeted at California or that the plaintiff felt the brunt of the harm there.58 
These cases seem to stand for the principle that an out-of-state plaintiff faces a 
high barrier to gaining jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant by relying on the 
effects test, but that jurisdiction is not closed off entirely. The California cases involving 
Steve Rambam indicate that a plaintiff must establish that his reputation will suffer its 
greatest harm in that jurisdiction. That can be done by showing that the plaintiff conducts 
most of his business in that state and is regularly present in the state as a non-resident. 
And the Blakely case shows that in specific circumstances, such as having a pending 
sexual harassment case against a national corporation in the forum, an out-of-state 
plaintiff may be able to show that the brunt of the injury will be felt there.  
The Narrow View of Express Aiming and Knowledge 
Courts appear to take two divergent views on how the Calder effects test applies. 
The first is a narrow application of the express aiming and knowledge requirements.  In 
this interpretation a plaintiff typically must show that the defendant: 1) expressly aimed 
his conduct at the forum; and 2) had knowledge that the plaintiff was both a resident of 
the state and would likely feel the brunt of the harm in that state. The second, broad view 
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57 Id. at 1375 *27.  
58 Id.  
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will be discussed in part three, but it seems to require only that the defendant knew the 
defendant was a resident of the forum because knowledge of residency will likely fulfill 
the targeting requirement. The key difference appears to be that courts applying the 
narrow approach require some showing that defendant targeted an audience in the forum, 
not just the plaintiff who happens to live in the forum, while courts applying the broad 
approach will frequently be satisfied that targeting has occurred when there is evidence 
that the defendant knew where the plaintiff lived.  
Rejecting jurisdiction under the narrow view 
In the first Internet defamation jurisdiction case to make its way through the 
Minnesota courts, Griffis v. Luban,59 the Minnesota Supreme Court took a narrow view 
of the effects test after reversing a court of appeals decision that approached it broadly. 
The appeals court decision will be discussed briefly before the state supreme court’s 
pronouncement. Griffis v. Luban60 came to the Minnesota Court of Appeals as a collateral 
attack on an Alabama libel judgment.61 The plaintiff in Griffis was an adjunct instructor 
at the University of Alabama at Birmingham who taught non-credit courses in ancient 
Egyptian history and culture.62 She and the defendant were both members of an Internet 
newsgroup devoted to archeology.63 The defendant, a Minnesota resident, posted a series 
of messages questioning the plaintiff’s credentials and truthfulness.64 The plaintiff sued 
                                                 
59 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002).  
60 633 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d, 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002).  
61 Id. at 549.  
62 Id.  
63 Id. at 550.  
64 Id.  
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for defamation in Alabama and won a $25,000 default judgment.65 When she tried to 
enforce the judgment in Minnesota, the defendant attacked the Alabama court’s exertion 
of jurisdiction.66 The Minnesota trial court found that Alabama had jurisdiction, and the 
defendant appealed.67  
 The Minnesota appellate court first found that Alabama’s long-arm rule allowed 
jurisdiction to the full extent of due process and then said it would apply the Calder 
effects test to determine whether sufficient minimum contacts existed to exert 
jurisdiction.68 The court did not clearly define the effects test, instead it paraphrased the 
test in a way that required reasonable anticipation that the state could exert jurisdiction 
over the defendant and that the “brunt of the injury” would be felt there.69 In applying the 
effects test this way the court focused on two factors: 1) the defendant’s knowledge that 
Alabama was where the plaintiff lived and 2) the defendant’s repeated postings about the 
plaintiff even after being threatened with legal action.70 The court considered the repeated 
postings after receiving a warning letter from an Alabama attorney as knowledge that the 
messages were causing harm in Alabama and adequate to satisfy due process.71 
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 The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed.72 After an extensive discussion of the 
Calder facts, the court adopted a version of the effects test previously announced by the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Imo Industries, Inc. v. Kiekert,73 a tortious interference 
case. As the Minnesota court explained the Imo Industries version of the effects test, it 
has three prongs that the plaintiff must meet:  
(1) the defendant committed an intentional tort; (2) the plaintiff felt the 
brunt of the harm caused by that tort in the forum such that the forum state 
was the focal point of the plaintiff’s injury; and (3) the defendant 
expressly aimed the tortious conduct at the forum such that forum state 
was the focal point of the tortious activity.74 
 
This casting of the effects test requires the forum state to be the focal point of both the 
harm suffered and the tortious activity. It is not enough that the activity entered into the 
state. It must be targeted there, and that targeting implicitly includes the knowledge 
requirement described as a characteristic of the narrow view. 
 In applying this construction of the effects test, the Griffis court found that 
Alabama could not exert jurisdiction because it failed both the second and third prongs.75 
The plaintiff had not presented any evidence that any other Alabama residents, besides 
herself, had read the statements; thus she had not shown that Alabama was the focal point 
of her injury.76 Similarly, there was no evidence that the messages had been targeted at 
Alabama.77 While the defendant knew that the plaintiff was an Alabama resident, the 
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75 Id. at 535.  
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messages made no mention of Alabama and were posted to an archeology newsgroup that 
had no specific connection to the state.78   
The Fourth Circuit, in what may be a model approach for Internet defamation, 
took a somewhat different tack in Young v. New Haven Advocate.79 Young involved 
claims of defamation on websites of out-of-state newspapers.80 The plaintiff was a 
Virginia prison warden.81 Two Connecticut newspapers – the New Haven Advocate and 
The Hartford Courant – published stories and columns about state prisoners who had 
been moved to prisons in Virginia in order to relieve prison overcrowding in 
Connecticut.82 The Advocate article included claims that inmates at the prison warden 
Young ran, Wallens Ridge, were not given adequate medical care, lacked proper hygiene 
and were denied religious privileges.83 The article also included a claim by a state senator 
that Young had Confederate memorabilia in his office.84 The Courant columns did not 
mention Young by name but included allegations by Connecticut prisoners housed at 
Wallens Ridge that they had suffered cruelty at the hands of the prison guards.85 The 
prison was described as a “cut-rate gulag.”86 
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Young brought libel claims against the newspapers, their reporters and editors in 
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia.87 The district court found 
jurisdiction based on the Internet postings as contacts, and the Fourth Circuit allowed an 
interlocutory appeal.88 The newspapers had some limited contacts with Virginia: the 
Courant had a small number of subscribers there, and journalists for both papers had 
made some phone calls to the state during their reporting.89 The warden did not argue 
jurisdiction based on those contacts, so the Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction analysis was 
focused on whether the stories being posted on the Internet, and thus accessible in 
Virginia, were sufficient contacts to satisfy due process.90 
The court relied on its own recent decision in ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service 
Consultants, Inc.,91 an Internet jurisdiction case involving a copyright claim, and Calder. 
The court noted, “Calder, though not an Internet case, has particular relevance here 
because it deals with personal jurisdiction in the context of a libel suit.”92  In ALS Scan 
the court had applied Calder and held that “specific jurisdiction in the Internet context 
may be based only on an out-of-state person’s Internet activity directed at [the forum] and 
causing injury that gives rise to a potential cognizable claim [there].”93 The ALS Scan 
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88 Id. at 260.  
89 Id. at 259-60. The Courant had eight subscribers in Virginia when the stories were printed. Id. at 260.  
90 Id. at 261-63.  
91 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002).  
92 Young, 313 F.3d at 262.  
93 Id. at 714. 
69 
 
court stated its interpretation of appropriate jurisdiction arising out of Internet contacts 
based on Calder’s effects test as follows:  
[A] State may, consistent with due process, exercise judicial power over a 
person outside of the State when that person (1) directs electronic activity 
into the State, (2) with the manifested intent of engaging in business or 
other interactions within the State, and (3) that activity creates, in a person 
within the State, a potential cause of action cognizable in the State’s 
courts.94 
 
The Young court said that the plaintiff feeling the effects of libel in Virginia was 
insufficient to sustain jurisdiction on its own.95 The plaintiff also needed to show that the 
defendants had directed their conduct at Virginia.96 It further refined the ALS Scan test by 
requiring “[t]he newspaper must, through the Internet postings, manifest an intent to 
target and focus on Virginia readers.”97 Because Connecticut, not Virginia, was the focal 
point of the articles, the Fourth Circuit found that jurisdiction could not be sustained.98 
The Young court effectively required a showing of targeted or directed conduct at both 
the plaintiff and the forum in order to uphold jurisdiction. 
Both the Young and the Griffis opinions would influence other courts. The first to 
consider either was Alabama, which followed Griffis closely in a quite similar case, 
Novak v. Benn.99 Novak gave the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals its first chance to 
decide an Internet jurisdiction case. Like Griffis, Novak came to the court as a collateral 
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attack on a default judgment. The defamation suit, filed in Alabama, arose out of 
messages posted in a Compuserve forum for people who keep aquariums.100 The plaintiff, 
John Benn, an attorney, accused the defendant of posting messages under a pseudonym 
that falsely claimed a complaint was pending against Benn at the Alabama state bar.101 
Novak initially contested the suit, having it removed to federal court and filing a 
counterclaim.102 He apparently abandoned his claims and defense when the federal court 
remanded the case back to the state court, and Benn won a default judgment.103 
On appeal, Novak attacked jurisdiction, arguing that he had insufficient contacts 
with Alabama to reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.104 The court quoted 
extensively and favorably from Griffis, the Minnesota Supreme Court case with similar 
facts in which the court interpreted Alabama law, in its application of the effects test.105 
Like the Minnesota Supreme Court, the Alabama court relied on the three-pronged 
approach to the effects test outlined in Imo Industries.106 The Alabama court found that 
nothing in the text of the allegedly libelous statements indicated an intent to target 
Alabama and nothing in the record indicated that the defendant knew the brunt of the 
harm would be felt there.107 
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The Sixth Circuit in The Cadle Company v. Schlichtmann,108 an unpublished 
opinion, applied a Zippo-Calder two-step analysis, first using the sliding scale of 
interactivity and then the effects test. The defendant, a Massachusetts resident, had 
launched a website accusing The Cadle Company, an Ohio debt collection company, of 
violating various debt collection laws in Massachusetts and seeking other potential 
plaintiffs in a class-action lawsuit against the company.109 Statements on the website 
formed the basis for a defamation claim against the defendant, and he contested 
jurisdiction.110 How the court dealt with Zippo will be discussed in Chapter 4. After 
determining that jurisdiction could not be asserted on a Zippo theory, the court turned to 
the Calder effects test.111 In its explanation of Calder, the court found a requirement that 
Ohio be the focal point of both the writings and the harm suffered, and that the defendant 
knew the plaintiff would suffer the “brunt of the injury” there.112 In applying the test, the 
court found no jurisdiction because the content of the writings was focused on the 
plaintiff’s activities in Massachusetts and the audience targeted was in Massachusetts, not 
Ohio. 
The Third Circuit used its own application of the effects test in Imo Industries, 
Inc. v. Kiekert113 as its guide when jurisdiction came up in an Internet defamation case, 
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Marten v. Godwin.114 The record in Marten was sparse, and it’s unclear from the court’s 
opinion where exactly the allegedly defamatory statements were made, i.e., email, an 
Internet forum, or a letter, although several possibilities are discussed. One of the 
problems with the record was the plaintiff, a Pennsylvania resident who had enrolled in 
an online graduate program of the University of Kansas School of Pharmacy,115  never set 
out what the allegedly defamatory statements were.116 After an accusation of plagiarism, 
the plaintiff was expelled from the program.117 He then sued, alleging defamation and 
retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.118 The district court dismissed for lack of 
personal jurisdiction after discovery.119 
The Marten court began its analysis with the third prong in the Imo Industries test 
– express aiming – stating that the other two elements should only be considered if the 
express aiming element was met.120 “To establish that the defendant ‘expressly aimed’ 
his conduct, the plaintiff has to demonstrate that ‘the defendant knew that the plaintiff 
would suffer the brunt of the harm caused by the tortious conduct in the forum, and point 
to specific activity indicating that the defendant expressly aimed its tortious conduct at 
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the forum.”121 In applying this standard, the court found that the defendant had failed to 
allege facts that could be construed as “deliberate targeting of Pennsylvania.”122  
The North Carolina Court of Appeals adopted the Young analysis in Dailey v. 
Popma.123 Dailey involved posts on a message board for firearms enthusiasts.124 The 
plaintiff, Jack Dailey, was a North Carolina resident who owned a shooting range.125 The 
defendant was a Georgia resident at the time the allegedly defamatory posts were made 
on the Internet, though he had been a North Carolina resident a little more than a year 
prior.126 The court framed the issue this way: “The dispositive question before this Court 
is whether posting messages on an internet bulletin board about a North Carolina resident 
and businessman constitutes sufficient minimum contacts to support a finding of personal 
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.”127 The court then provided a brief discussion 
of Young before calling the reasoning “persuasive” and adopting the analysis.128  
That changed the focus of the question to whether the defendant intended to target 
North Carolina readers with his posts.129 Because the plaintiff had not provided the 
allegedly defamatory statements, the court found there was no evidence of intent to target 
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North Carolina, and therefore jurisdiction could not be sustained.130 The court rejected 
the plaintiff’s argument that the effects the postings had on him in North Carolina were 
sufficient to sustain jurisdiction.131 “A holding otherwise would confer jurisdiction in 
each state in which a plaintiff was affected by internet postings. The defense of lack of 
personal jurisdiction would, in effect, be eliminated from all cases involving 
defamation.”132 
In Johnson v. Arden,133 the Eighth Circuit adopted a narrow view of the effects 
test’s express aiming requirement and found no jurisdiction in an Internet defamation 
case involving cat breeders.134 The plaintiffs were Missouri residents who ran the Cozy 
Kitten Cattery.135 The defendants were the proprietors of the website 
ComplaintsBoard.com, the website’s hosting service, a former Cozy Kitten employee 
who lived in Colorado, and a woman who lived in California. The plaintiffs alleged 
defamation based on posts made to the ComplaintsBoard website accusing them of 
stealing money from clients, treating animals cruelly and killing them unnecessarily.136 
The trial court dismissed the case against all the defendants for lack of jurisdiction, and 
the plaintiffs appealed regarding the hosting service, the former employee and the 
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California resident, but not the website operators.137 The Eighth Circuit quickly dismissed 
the hosting service under Section 230 immunity,138 so it was left with the former 
employee from Colorado and the California defendant. 
 After first applying Zippo and finding that jurisdiction could not be asserted under 
that theory, the court turned to the Calder effects test.139  It adopted the following 
construction of the effects test:   
“[A] defendant’s tortious acts can serve as a source of personal 
jurisdiction only where the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing that the 
defendant’s acts (1) were intentional, (2) were uniquely or expressly 
aimed at the forum state, and (3) caused harm, the brunt of which was 
suffered – and the defendant knew was likely to be suffered – in the forum 
state.”140 
 
This is a narrow construction of express aiming requiring evidence that the action was 
targeting the forum state in addition to knowledge that the defendant would suffer the 
brunt of the harm there.141 In applying this to the defendants, the court found evidence of 
the targeting of Missouri to be lacking. The state name was mentioned in some of the 
posts, but the court called that “incidental.”142 
Finding jurisdiction under the narrow view 
                                                 
137 Id.  
138 Id. Section 230 immunity refers to the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 
(West 2008), which grants immunity to internet service providers for tortious conduct of their users. It 
has been interpreted to protect website administrators from liability for comments left by their users. 
139 Johnson, 614 F.3d at 796.  
140 Id. (quoting Lindgregn v. GDT, LLC 312 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (S.D. Iowa 2004)).  
141 Id.  
142 Id.  
76 
 
In a short, unpublished opinion, Northwest Healthcare Alliance v. 
Healthgrades.com,143 the Ninth Circuit said it had adopted two separate frameworks for 
Internet jurisdiction cases: one based on the Zippo sliding scale and one based on 
Calder’s effects test.144 It then said the effects test is the appropriate framework when the 
“harm allegedly suffered by plaintiff sounds in tort.”145 Because Northwest Healthcare 
Alliance was a defamation case, the court then applied the effects test to find jurisdiction 
existed.146  
The plaintiff was a Washington state home health care provider, and the 
defendant was a company incorporated in Delaware and based in Colorado.147 The 
defendant maintained a website, Healthgrades.com, on which it rated health care 
providers, and it had rated the plaintiff.148 That rating was the basis for the defamation 
lawsuit.149 The Northwest Healthcare court adopted a narrow view of the effects test, 
saying the test has three elements and jurisdiction is proper if the defendant: “1) engaged 
in intentional actions; 2) expressly aimed at the forum state; 3) causing harm, the brunt of 
which is suffered – and which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered – in the forum 
state.”150 Applying this construction, it was easy for the court to find jurisdiction proper 
                                                 
143 50 Fed. App’x 339 (9th Cir. 2002).  
144 Id. at 340.  
145 Id.  
146 Id. at 341.  
147 Id. at 339.  
148 Id.  
149 Id. at 340.  
150 Id. at 341.  
77 
 
because the defendant had gathered information from Washington state to create the 
review, indicating knowledge that the health care provider was based there and would 
feel harm there, and had expressly aimed its actions at the forum since its purpose was to 
reach health care customers in Washington who might use the plaintiff’s services.151 
The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey considered the 
Blakely analysis in its next jurisdiction case involving Internet defamation, Goldhaber v. 
Kohlenberg.152 The court did not find Blakely to be determinative because the plaintiff in 
Goldhaber was a New Jersey resident, the defendant’s discussion of the state in his 
offending comments was extensive, and several courts outside New Jersey had 
subsequently issued opinions on similar cases.153 The Goldhaber defendant was a 
resident of California with no New Jersey contacts.154 He posted messages on an Internet 
newsgroup accusing the plaintiffs, New Jersey residents, of incest and bestiality, among 
other things.155 They sued for defamation in New Jersey and won a default judgment in 
excess of $1 million.156 The defendant contested jurisdiction on appeal.157  
The New Jersey court distinguished Blakely by looking at how courts in other 
jurisdictions had dealt with the due process analysis in intervening years. It looked 
favorably on Griffis for the principle that “mere posting of messages upon . . . an open 
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forum by a resident of one state that could be read in a second state was not sufficient to 
confer jurisdiction upon the latter.”158 The appellate court considered Blakely as the New 
Jersey Supreme Court adopting Calder’s effects test, and then it returned to Calder for 
guidance.159 In applying the effects test, the court found that the defendant’s detailed 
knowledge of where plaintiffs lived and references to that knowledge in his posts were 
adequate to indicate a targeting of the state.160 The defendant posted repeated, 
“disparaging”  references to the town the plaintiff’s lived in, to the police in that town, 
and “he referred to plaintiffs’ neighbors in the apartment complex in which they resided 
and at one point even posted their address.”161 While the opinion does not state exactly 
what the allegedly defamatory statements were, it does note that the plaintiff felt so 
threatened by them that she “sought protection from her local police department.”162 
Thus, the court upheld jurisdiction based solely on the defendants’ Internet posts.163 It is 
not clear that this case is applying the narrow view of Calder since the court did not set 
out the defendant’s statements or its rationale for announcing that the contacts were 
adequate to indicate targeting of New Jersey. But based on its reliance on Griffis and its 
description of comments that revealed the plaintiff’s address, described her neighbors and 
caused her to file a police report out of fear, it appears the court found intentional 
targeting of New Jersey above mere knowledge that the plaintiff lived there.  
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The Tenth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, Silver v. Brown,164 found 
jurisdiction appropriate in a case arising out of a defamatory blog.165 The plaintiff and the 
defendant had been involved in a contractual business relationship that turned sour.166 
The defendant, a Florida resident unhappy with the way the situation was being handled, 
registered a domain name with the plaintiff’s name, his hometown, and the name of his 
business in it – www.davidsilversantafe.com – and then started posting claims that the 
plaintiff was a “thief.”167 The plaintiff, a New Mexico resident, sued in New Mexico for 
defamation.168  
The court turned to the Calder effects test to assist in its jurisdictional analysis.169 
Its understanding of the effects test was that it there must be a showing of: 
 “(a) an intentional action (writing, editing, and publishing the article), that 
was (b) expressly aimed at the forum state (the article was about a 
California resident and her activities in California; likewise it was drawn 
from California sources and widely distributed in that state), with (c) 
knowledge that the brunt of the injury would be felt in the forum state 
(defendants knew Ms. Jones was in California and her career revolved 
around the entertainment industry there).”170 
 
In applying this test to the case in Silver, the court found that the express aiming element 
was satisfied because the blog complained about the plaintiff’s activities in New Mexico, 
the blog was widely accessible in New Mexico, and the defendant had included “Santa 
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Fe” in the blog’s domain name as part of an effort to increase its visibility there.171 The 
knowledge requirement was also met because the parties had been involved in a New 
Mexico-based business transaction prior to the blog posts and the defendant knew that 
was where the plaintiff lived and did most of his work.172 
 These narrow view cases are not identical. There is a strain rooted in the Young 
case in which jurisdiction is more difficult to obtain because the plaintiff has to show not 
only intentional, targeted contacts with the forum state, but also that the publisher was 
intending to focus on readers in that forum as its audience. Thus, publishing in a way that 
indicates a desire to reach a national audience or a specific audience in another forum is 
going to preclude jurisdiction in the plaintiff’s home state under Young. The content of 
the allegedly libelous publication – and not just the libelous statement – becomes 
paramount in Young. On the other hand, cases such as Goldhaber and Silver indicate that 
when there are discussions of a particular forum in the offending publication that may 
very well be adequate to confer jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.  
The Broad View of Express Aiming and Knowledge 
The other way to approach the Calder effects test is to take a more permissive 
view of what constitutes the express aiming and knowledge requirements. In this 
framework, it is generally adequate to show that a defendant 1) knew the plaintiff was a 
resident of the forum and 2) took action that would harm the plaintiff in the forum. In this 
view, knowledge that the plaintiff lives in a particular forum coupled with a tortious act 
against the plaintiff is enough to subsume the targeting analysis. The court does not need 
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to determine that comments were intended to be read in a particular forum, only that they 
were intended to harm the plaintiff and there was knowledge of where the plaintiff lives. 
It seems to equate knowing the plaintiff lives in a particular forum with targeting that 
forum. It also seems to minimize the requirement that the defendant knew the “brunt of 
the injury” would be felt in the forum.  
Rejecting jurisdiction under the broad view 
Just a few weeks after the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Young, the Fifth Circuit 
issued an opinion in a similar case using different reasoning. Revell v. Lidov173 arose out 
of an article posted on Columbia University’s journalism school website in New York.174  
The article was written by a Massachusetts resident, Hart Lidov.175 The focus of the 
article was the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing in Lockerbie, Scotland.176 Lidov accused the 
Reagan Administration of a broad conspiracy to cover up advance warning it had 
received of the attack.177 The plaintiff, Oliver “Buck” Revell, had been an associate 
deputy director of the FBI working in the Washington, D.C.-area at the time of the 
bombing.178 The article alleged that Revell knew of the attack in advance and made sure 
his son took a different flight since the son was scheduled to be on Pan Am 103.179 
Revell, a Texas resident at the time the article was published, sued Lidov and Columbia 
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for libel in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas.180 Lidov filed an 
affidavit that he did not know Revell was a Texas resident prior to the lawsuit.181 The 
district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.182 
 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit turned first to the sliding scale of interactivity in 
Zippo, which it had previously treated favorably in non-tort contexts.183 Its reasoning for 
declining to assert jurisdiction under Zippo is discussed thoroughly in Chapter 4.184 After 
considering interactivity, the court turned to Calder’s effects test to determine whether 
jurisdiction would be appropriate.185 The court found that Calder stands for the 
proposition that “[t]he defendant must be chargeable with knowledge of the forum at 
which his conduct is directed in order to reasonably anticipate being haled into court in 
that forum.”186 The court also stated that the “‘effects’ test is but one facet of the ordinary 
minimum contacts analysis, to be considered as part of the full range of the defendant’s 
contacts with the forum.”187  
 In applying the effects test, the court noted that the allegedly libelous article 
contained no references to Texas and wasn’t describing any activities that took place in 
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Texas.188 “These facts weigh heavily against finding the requisite minimum contacts in 
this case.”189 The court also found that nothing in the article indicated it was targeted at 
Texas readers over readers from other places.190 Thus, the absence of a specific reference 
to the forum, description of activities in the forum or indication that readers in the forum 
were being targeted over others was determinative in finding that Texas was not the 
“focal point of the article or the harm suffered.”191 In the Fifth Circuit’s view, the 
plaintiff’s residency in the forum and suffering harm there were not adequate to sustain 
jurisdiction.192  If the court stopped there, this analysis would appear to fit in the narrow 
view of cases describe in part two above. But the court instead continued and in doing so 
announced a fairly broad view that mere knowledge of a plaintiff’s residence coupled 
with a defamatory statement is likely adequate to establish targeting of the forum:193  
Demanding knowledge of a particular forum to which conduct is directed, 
in defamation cases, is not altogether distinct from the requirement that the 
forum be the focal point of the tortious activity because satisfaction of the 
latter will ofttimes provide sufficient evidence of the former. Lidov must 
have known that the harm of the article would hit home where Revell 
resided. But that is the case with virtually any defamation.194 
 
Lidov’s not knowing that Revell lived in Texas appears to be all that saved him from 
facing jurisdiction there.   
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 The Fifth Circuit briefly revisited personal jurisdiction in Internet defamation in 
an unpublished opinion, Ouazzani-Chahdi v. Greensboro News & Record, Inc.195 The 
plaintiff was a Texas attorney who had been mentioned in a story in a North Carolina 
newspaper article on “sham marriages” designed to obtain United States citizenship 
illegally.196 Several years after the newspaper article was published, the plaintiff 
discovered a copy of it on the Internet and sued for defamation in Texas state court.197 
After the case was removed to federal district court, it was dismissed for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.198 The plaintiff asserted jurisdiction based on the newspaper’s Internet 
contacts with Texas, but the Fifth Circuit focused instead on its non-Internet contacts 
with the state.199 The court relied on its previous decision in Revell for the principle that 
aiming is satisfied when “(1) the subject matter of and (2) the sources relied upon for the 
article were in the forum state.”200 The newspaper circulated only three copies in Texas, 
had not relied on any Texas sources in the reporting of its story, and had not described 
any activities that took place in Texas.201 Thus, the plaintiff couldn’t show that he felt the 
brunt of the harm in Texas or that the newspaper had expressly aimed its conduct there.202 
The key became the newspaper’s lack of knowledge of the plaintiff’s residence, just as it 
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was in Revell. There was no evidence that the News & Record knew the plaintiff had 
moved to Texas.  
Finding jurisdiction under the broad view 
In Kauffman Racing Equipment v. Roberts,203 the Ohio Court of Appeals 
considered whether posts on an Internet auction site and a message board were adequate 
contacts to assert jurisdiction over a Virginia resident.204 The plaintiff, Kauffman Racing, 
was an Ohio business that sold high performance auto parts.205 The defendant, Scott 
Roberts, ordered an engine from Kauffman racing in early 2006.206 Several months after 
receiving the engine, Roberts complained to Kauffman racing that the engine was faulty 
and asked for a refund.207 Kauffman Racing agreed to examine the engine and had it 
shipped back to Ohio, where it determined that the performance problems were the result 
of modifications Roberts had made.208 Unhappy with the Ohio company’s decision not to 
refund the purchase price, Roberts took to the Internet to express his dissatisfaction.209 
He posted messages on websites dedicated to racing as well as on the auction site 
eBay in which he called the engine a “useless block” and “worthless” and said he was 
“[j]ust trying to help other potential victims.”210 The court briefly discussed the Zippo 
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sliding scale before finding jurisdiction based on Calder.211 “A non-resident defendant 
who avails himself of the expansive reach of the Internet should not be able to use his 
non-residency as a shield against defending tortious activity against a plaintiff harmed in 
a different state.”212 In applying Calder, the court did not announce any particular 
interpretation of the effects test, rather it simply declared:  
The alleged defamation concerned a business located in Ohio and the 
business practices of an Ohio resident. Roberts was aware of these facts 
when he posted his messages. Although Kauffman Racing conducted 
business over the Internet, which is accessible worldwide, the defamation 
impugned the propriety of Kauffman Racing’s business dealings, which 
are centered in Ohio. The brunt of the harm, in terms of the injury to 
Kauffman Racing’s professional reputation and business, was suffered in 
Ohio. In sum, Ohio is the focal point both of the defamation and of the 
harm suffered. Jurisdiction over Roberts is, therefore, proper in Ohio 
based upon the “effects” of his Virginia conduct in Ohio.213 
 
The court clearly found Ohio to be the focal point of the injury, but it never addressed the 
other major prong of Calder – the express aiming analysis, that is, whether Roberts 
specifically targeted an audience in Ohio.  
 On review the Ohio Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction in Kauffman Racing v. 
Roberts214 but used a different application of the Calder effects test. The state supreme 
court focused on two aspects of Roberts’ allegedly defamatory statements. The first was 
an expression of direct intent to harm Kauffman Racing: “I guess it doesn’t matter that 
the day I got it all of the defects exsisted [sic] and nothing that I have done caused them. 
But don’t worry about that. What I loose [sic] in dollars I will make up in entertainment 
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at their expence [sic].”215 The second was the receipt of his comments by at least five 
Ohio residents.216 Thus when the Ohio court adopted a very broad interpretation of the 
express aiming element of Calder — focusing not on whether the defendant targeted the 
state but whether any Ohio resident read his comments — it was easy to find jurisdiction:  
Like the defendants in Calder, Roberts is not alleged to have engaged in 
untargeted negligence. Robert’s Internet commentary reveals a blatant 
intent to harm KRE’s reputation. Roberts knew that KRE was an Ohio 
company. Roberts impugned the activities that KRE undertakes in Ohio. 
Roberts hoped that this commentary would have a devastating effect on 
KRE and that if there were fallout from his comments, the brunt of the 
harm would be suffered in Ohio.217  
 
 In a brief dissent Justice Terrence O’Donnell criticized the majority opinion for 
the breadth with which it interpreted the express aiming element and for failure to 
consider the pervasiveness of the speech’s contact with the forum. He noted that the U.S. 
Supreme Court pointed to the National Enquirer’s extensive circulation in California – 
more than 600,000 copies – when it conferred jurisdiction using the effects test.218 
O’Donnell also argued in favor of a narrower view of express aiming that requires 
something more to show that the defendant had an intent to target the forum and not just 
harm the plaintiff.219 “By merely posting to general websites, Roberts neither deliberately 
engaged in significant activities within Ohio nor purposefully directed his activities at an 
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Ohio resident sufficient to establish minimum contacts and satisfy due process – 
regardless of his intent.”220 
The Seventh Circuit adopted an interpretation of Calder based, in part, on the Imo 
Industries case in Tamburo v. Dworkin.221 The facts in Tamburo were similar to many of 
the earlier cases. The plaintiff, an Illinois man, was involved in the dog-breeding business 
and had compiled a searchable pedigree database.222 The data for his database were 
compiled from other publicly available websites that contained pedigree information.223 
The defendants were dog breeders from Colorado, Michigan, Ohio and Canada, and a 
software company from Australia.224 Some of the defendants began posting accusations 
on various dog breeding message boards and email listservs that the plaintiff had stolen 
the information in his database from their websites.225 The plaintiff sued for defamation. 
All of the defendants had limited contacts with Illinois other than the messages posted to 
the Internet and email listserves.226 They all moved to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of 
personal jurisdiction.227  
The Tamburo court characterized the Calder effects test as requiring: “(1) 
intentional conduct (or intentional and allegedly tortious conduct); (2) expressly aimed at 
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the forum state; (3) with the defendant’s knowledge that the effects would be felt – that 
is, the plaintiff would be injured – in the forum state.”228  While this construction is based 
in part on Imo, where it differs significantly is that the court did not require either that the 
forum state be the focal point of the injury or evidence that the defendants targeted their 
communications at an Illinois audience.229 
Using this formulation, the court upheld jurisdiction against the American and 
Canadian defendants because the messages specifically referenced the plaintiff’s Illinois 
address, encouraged other dog breeders to contact him, and asked people to boycott his 
products.230 These acts showed that the defendants “engaged in this conduct with 
knowledge that Tamburo lived in Illinois and operated his business there.”231 Thus the 
court equated mere knowledge of Tamburo’s residence and place of business with 
express aiming at the forum state.232 
The Missouri Court of Appeals adopted the Tamburo court’s Calder framework 
just a few months later in Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith.233 After an extensive review of the 
case law – and many of the existing disputes between jurisdictions – on the application of 
the effects test to Internet jurisdiction issues, the Missouri court said it was following the 
Tamburo court for two reasons.234 First, it believed Tamburo struck the proper balance 
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between broad and narrow interpretations of the express aiming element.235 Second, the 
facts of the two cases were nearly identical.236 Like Tamburo, Baldwin also involved a 
dispute between people involved in dog breeding suing for libel over Internet 
comments.237 In Baldwin, the plaintiff was a Missouri breeder of Chinese crested dogs.238 
The defendants – also breeders of Chinese crested dogs – created a website, www.stop-
whisperinglane.com, attacking the plaintiff’s practices.239 In applying the Tamburo 
framework, the Baldwin court found that even if Calder does require a specific targeting 
of Missouri or a Missouri audience – and not just the plaintiffs there – that element was 
satisfied because the defendants had discussed Missouri animal care laws extensively in 
the posts they made.240 
These broad view cases seem to make it easy to confer jurisdiction, such as in 
Kauffman Racing in which the defendant didn’t even mention Ohio in his posts and had 
never been to Ohio. Because the defendant knew the plaintiff lived there and indicated 
intent to exact revenge, that was adequate for jurisdiction. Had a Young-like framework 
been applied to that case, jurisdiction would not have been sustained because Roberts’ 
audience wasn’t Ohio-specific but rather subject-specific – car enthusiasts. Yet even 
under these broad view cases, jurisdiction will be denied, such as in Revell, when there is 
no connection with the forum in the defendant’s writings. If the defendant gathers no 
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information from the state, doesn’t mention the state and has no other connections with 
the state, then jurisdiction will not be appropriate.  
Declining to apply Calder 
In a handful of cases, the courts considered the effects test but did not apply it. In 
some cases, that was a result of finding that a different framework was more appropriate, 
and in others it was because the court felt it simply did not apply to the facts in front of it.  
 The Indiana Court of Appeals was the first appellate court post-Zippo to consider 
jurisdiction in an Internet libel case. In Conseco, Inc. v. Hickerson241 an Indiana 
insurance company alleged trademark dilution and infringement, commercial 
disparagement, tortious interference as well as libel.242 The defendant was a Texas 
resident who had published a website accusing Philadelphia Life Insurance, a Conseco 
subsidiary, of fraud.243 The trial court dismissed the claims for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.244 On appeal, Conseco argued that jurisdiction was appropriate under the 
Calder effects test because Indiana was where the corporation was based and where its 
reputation would be most heavily damaged.245 
The appellate court rejected that argument and specifically declined to apply the 
Calder effects test because Conseco was a major, national corporation. “In this case, 
Conseco is a national corporation with insurance subsidiaries and policyholders 
throughout the United States. The potential harm to be suffered by Hickerson’s alleged 
                                                 
241 698 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).  
242 Id. at 817.  
243 Id.  
244 Id.  
245 Id. at 818.  
92 
 
defamation would not only be suffered in Indiana, but throughout the nation.”246 The 
court then turned to a Zippo-framework for its personal jurisdiction decision,247 which 
will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 The North Dakota Supreme Court briefly discussed the Calder effects test in 
Wagner v. Mishkin248 before deciding the jurisdiction issue on a more general approach to 
contacts than effects alone.249 The plaintiff in Wagner was a professor at the University 
of North Dakota, and the defendant was a former student in one of his physics classes.250 
The student was suspended from the university for “stalking and harassing” the 
professor.251 She subsequently moved back to Minnesota and launched the website 
www.undnews.com.252 She used this website to level all sorts of accusations of 
inappropriate behavior against the professor.253 The professor sued, and a jury awarded 
$3 million in damages for libel, slander and intentional interference with business 
relationships.254 The defendant represented herself at trial and on appeal, and the plaintiff 
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represented himself on appeal, which created some difficulties for the appellate court in 
evaluating both of their claims because the record was incomplete.255 
That incompleteness hampered the court’s analysis of jurisdiction based on 
Internet contacts.256 The court discussed the Calder effects test but didn’t apply it because 
there wasn’t enough in the record to make that determination.257 The record did provide 
enough for the court to find specific targeting of North Dakota with the Internet 
communications; in particular the website’s Internet address had an abbreviation  of the 
University of North Dakota (UND) in it, and the articles on the site related to the 
university.258 That targeting coupled with the defendant’s other forum contacts – having 
been a student at the University of North Dakota, use of the university’s email system, 
having lived on campus there and phone calls into the jurisdiction – were adequate to 
sustain personal jurisdiction.259  
The Florida Court of Appeals also briefly mentioned Calder in Renaissance 
Health Publishing v. Resveratrol Partners,260 but not for the effects test. Instead it cited 
Calder for the proposition that a defendant must be able to “reasonably anticipate being 
                                                 
255 Id. at 596-97.  
256 Id. at 598 (“This Court has not previously had occasion to consider an Internet jurisdiction case. The 
present case lacking a complete transcript of the district court proceedings, does not provide us with a 
sufficient record to undertake such an analysis.”) 
257 Id.  
258 Id. at 599.  
259 Id.  
260 982 So.2d 739 (Fla. Ct. App. 2008).  
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haled into court there.”261 The court then relied on Zippo, as discussed in Chapter 4, to 
make its decision on minimum contacts for due process.262 
Conclusion 
Appellate courts are all over the map in their application of Calder. Some find it 
inappropriate to apply in particular Internet defamation cases based on the facts 
presented.263 Some find it to be the most useful guide in understanding contacts in 
Internet defamation cases.264 Others find it to be a useful piece of the personal 
jurisdiction puzzle, but not the only piece.265 There doesn’t seem to be a discernable trend 
in the direction courts are going with the effects test, as in the last two years alone there 
were examples of courts relying primarily on Zippo,266 courts taking a very broad view of 
Calder’s effects test and finding jurisdiction in the flimsiest of circumstances,267 and 
courts taking very narrow views and rejecting jurisdiction.268 This lack of clarity is 
problematic. It leaves Internet users with little predictability about where they potentially 
can be dragged into court – the state next door or some far-flung jurisdiction – if someone 
chooses to sue over the content they have placed on the Internet.  
                                                 
261 Id. at 742.   
262 Id. at 741-43.  
263 Conseco v. Hickerson, 698 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).  
264 Young v. New Haven Advocate, 313 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002).  
265 Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002).  
266 Renaissance Health Publ’g v. Resveratrol Partners, 982 So.2d 739 (Fla. Ct. App. 2008).  
267 Kauffman Racing Equip. v. Roberts, 930 N.E. 2d 784 (Ohio 2010), cert denied Roberts v. Kauffman 
Racing Equip., No. 10-617, order (U.S. Jun. 28, 2011). .  
268 Dailey v. Popma, 662 S.E. 2d 12 (N.C. App. 2008).  
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Among these different frameworks, the narrow view – particularly that articulated 
by the Young court and followed in Dailey – is the preferable one because it allows for 
the most robust speech on the Internet. It requires a showing that the communication was 
actually targeted at an audience in the forum and wasn’t simply a general message aimed 
at anyone anywhere who chose to access it. An Internet user should not be potentially 
subjected to jurisdiction in any state simply because he wrote about someone and knew 
where that person lived, as occurred in Kauffman Racing. That kind of widespread 
potential for jurisdiction is a threat to discourse on the Internet. At the same time, while 
that narrow framework sets a high bar for pulling an out-of-state defendant into court, it 
is not impossible to meet, as the Tenth Circuit’s application of a narrow view in Silver 
showed.  
 
 
  
 
Chapter 4 
The Application of Zippo’s Sliding Scale to Internet Defamation Cases 
 In 1997 the Western District of Pennsylvania faced its first Internet 
jurisdiction case, Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,1 involving a 
trademark dispute. The plaintiff was Zippo Manufacturing, the well-known 
manufacturer of cigarette lighters based in Pennsylvania.2 The defendant was the 
owner of a subscription service website based in California that was using the Internet 
address www.zippo.com.3 The manufacturer sued the website for trademark 
infringement in Pennsylvania and the website operator contested jurisdiction.  
 The district court surveyed what little Internet jurisdiction law existed at the 
time and then introduced a brand new element to the analysis: a sliding scale of 
interactivity.4 The Zippo court described the ends of the scale in terms of how 
“passive” or active” the website is: 
If the defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign 
jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of 
computer files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. . . . At the 
                                                 
1 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997) 
2 Id. at 1121. 
 
3 Id.  
 
4 Id. 
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opposite end [of the scale] are situations where a defendant has simply 
posted information on an Internet Web site which is accessible to users in 
foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web site that does little more than make 
information available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for 
the exercise [of] personal jurisdiction. . . . The middle ground is occupied 
by interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information with the 
host computer. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by 
examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the 
exchange of information that occurs on the Web site.5 
 
This sliding scale test has subsequently been adopted by some courts, rejected 
outright by some, and incorporated as an additional analysis overlaying other 
jurisdictional frameworks by others. The influence of the Zippo sliding scale has been 
surprisingly strong for a district court opinion, but courts and commentators generally 
have noted it is not well suited to defamation cases.6 Despite that criticism, the case 
continues to have influence in Internet jurisdiction decisions, including those 
involving libel.  
In 16 of the cases studied for this thesis — Internet defamation cases decided by 
federal and state appellate courts between 1997 and 2010 — courts considered whether to 
apply Zippo or a variation of its sliding scale test to jurisdiction questions. Three basic 
approaches emerge from the 16 cases. Many courts view Zippo and Calder in conjunction 
with each other as two separate steps that each could confer jurisdiction on its own. This 
approach will be discussed in  part one. Some courts rejected Zippo outright as either 
inappropriate in an Internet defamation context or as an inappropriate special standard for 
                                                 
5 Id. at 1121.  
 
6 A LexisNexis Shepard’s search of the case in May 2011 indicated it had been followed 261 times, 
distinguished 47 times, and cited in 536 law review articles. Lexis Shepard’s Report for Zippo (May 16, 
2011) (on file with author). 
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Internet jurisdiction. This approach is covered in part two. Part three discusses the cases 
in which courts relied solely on Zippo’s sliding scale to determine jurisdiction.  
 
The Zippo-Calder Two Step  
One approach that appeared quite frequently was to view Zippo and Calder as 
separate frameworks that should be applied sequentially. If jurisdiction was not 
appropriate when the sliding scale of interactivity is applied, then those courts turn next 
to the effects test. This two-step analysis is interesting in that it could confer jurisdiction 
based solely on Zippo if a website is interactive and the proprietor has related, 
commercial contacts with the forum, regardless of content. But if the same message were 
posted on a passive website, jurisdiction may never be achieved under Zippo.  
The Fifth Circuit favorably drew on Zippo in Revell v. Lidov,7 a libel case arising 
out of an article posted on a New York university’s journalism school website.8 The 
plaintiff in Revell was a Texas resident who had been discussed in the article.9 The Fifth 
Circuit saw Zippo as fitting in as part of a multi-step analysis in which any of the steps 
might confer jurisdiction.10 First, it looked to the level of website interactivity under the 
Zippo sliding scale to determine if personal jurisdiction could be based on that theory.11 
The second step, after applying the sliding scale of interactivity, was to perform a 
                                                 
7 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002).  
8 For a more thorough discussion of the case facts see Chapter 3, notes 173-190 and accompanying text.  
9 Revell, 317 F.3d at 469.  
10 Id. at 469-70.  
11 Id.  
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minimum contacts analysis based on the content of the article and the defendants’ other 
contacts with the forums.12  
 In applying the Zippo scale the court slightly recast the test:  
Zippo used a “sliding scale” to measure an internet site’s connections to a 
forum state. A “passive” website, one that merely allows the owner to post 
information on the internet, is at one end of the scale. It will not be 
sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. At the other end are sites 
whose owners engage in repeated online contacts with forum residents 
over the internet, and in these cases personal jurisdiction may be proper. In 
between are those sites with some interactive elements, through which a 
site allows for bilateral information exchange with its visitors. Here we 
find more familiar terrain, requiring that we examine the extent of the 
interactivity and the extent of the forum contacts.13 
 
The website that the university was hosting functioned as a bulletin board, where users 
could post their own stories and read stories written by others.14 As the court described it, 
“[T]he visitor may participate in an open forum.”15 Thus the forum was “interactive” on 
the sliding scale, and the court had to then perform the second step of the analysis: 
examining the defendants’ other contacts with Texas to determine if jurisdiction existed. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the court rejected jurisdiction based on these additional 
contacts because they were minimal and did not show an intent to target Texas.16 
In Jewish Defense Organization, Inc. v. Superior Court17 the California Court of 
Appeal quoted the entire Zippo “sliding scale” passage before finding that the defendant’s 
                                                 
12 Id.  
13 Id. at 470.  
14 Id. at 472.  
15 Id.  
16 Id. at 473.  
17 72 Cal. App. 4th 1045 (1999).  
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“conduct in registering [plaintiff]’s name as a domain name and posting passive Web 
sites on the Internet is not sufficient to subject them to jurisdiction in California.”18 That 
was the extent of the court’s use of the sliding scale – quoting it extensively and then 
describing the websites at issue as “passive.”19 The only exploration of the websites’ 
character is in a brief footnote in which the court said the defendant’s “declarations 
explain in detail the nature of the Web sites, which meet the definition of passive Web 
sites set out in the Zippo . . . case.”20 The court then conducted a separate Internet-based 
jurisdictional analysis of entering into third-party contracts and applied it to the 
registration of the plaintiff’s name as a domain name21 even though the defamation 
claims in the case did not arise out of the domain name’s registration.22 
Similarly, in Nam Tai Electronics v. Titzer23 the California Court of Appeal again 
considered the sliding scale of interactivity in its discussion of jurisdiction involving 
Internet defamation.24 Like Jewish Defense Organization, Nam Tai Electronics involved 
a non-resident plaintiff and a non-resident defendant.25 The allegedly defamatory 
                                                 
18 Id. at 1060.  
19 Id.  
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 1060-61.  
22 Id. at 1051. The defendant had registered www.rambam-steve.com, and the plaintiff’s name was Steve 
Rambam. Id.  
23 93 Cal. App. 4th 1301 (2001), overruled in part by Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 4th 262 (2002). 
Pavlovich was a trade secrets case in which the court applied the Calder effects test to determine whether 
the state had jurisdiction over a Texas defendant. Pavlovich, 29 Cal. 4th at 266-67.   
24 Nam Tai Elec., 93 Cal. App. 4th at 1311.  
25 Id. at 1305.  
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messages had been posted on a Yahoo! message board.26 The theory of jurisdiction in 
California was based on Yahoo!’s corporate headquarters being there and its terms of 
service requiring users to agree that disputes would be governed by California law.27 The 
company tried to distinguish the case from Jewish Defense Organization by arguing that 
the defendant had affirmatively posted “almost 250 messages” on the Yahoo! message 
board.28 The court described this as “miss[ing] the point” and determined that jurisdiction 
shouldn’t be based on the sliding scale but on whether the effect of the harm would be 
felt in California.29 The same court, again, favorably quoted the Zippo sliding scale in 
Rambam v. Luhta30 but did not apply it in order to determine jurisdiction.31 
The Sixth Circuit in The Cadle Company v. Schlictmann,32 an unpublished 
opinion, began its jurisdiction analysis by applying the Zippo sliding scale.33 The court 
explained its understanding of the interactivity rationale: “The operation of an Internet 
website can constitute the purposeful availment of the privilege of acting in a forum state 
if the website is interactive to a degree that reveals specifically intended interaction with 
residents of the state.”34 In applying the test in this case, the court found that the website 
                                                 
26 Id.  
27 Id.  
28 Id. at 1312 
29 Id.  
30 2001 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1143 (2001).  
31 Id. at 1143, *18-19.  
32 123 Fed. App’x 675 (6th Cir. 2005).  
33 Id. at 678.  
34 Id.  
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in question was somewhere in the middle of the scale.35 The website was largely static in 
its description of alleged violations of Massachusetts debt collection laws,36 but it had a 
function allowing those interested in joining a class action lawsuit against the plaintiff to 
send a message to the website owner.37 When websites fall in the middle of the scale, the 
court said it turns to the commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs to 
complete the analysis. Because there was no evidence that anyone from Ohio had sent 
any information to the defendant through the website, the court found that jurisdiction 
could not be upheld based on the nature of the website.  The court then turned to a Calder 
effects analysis to determine if a basis for personal jurisdiction lay there.38 
The Eighth Circuit endorsed the Zippo-Calder two-step analysis in Johnson v. 
Arden,39 first applying Zippo’s sliding scale to determine if jurisdiction could 
appropriately be asserted.40 The court applied it to the ComplaintsBoard.com website and 
declared that the site was on the passive end of the scale, which meant that jurisdiction 
could not be exerted under that theory.41 The court’s explanation for finding the site 
passive is a bit odd given that its content is largely driven by user contributions. But the 
court said, “[U]sers may actually only post information. There is no interaction between 
                                                 
35 Id.  
36 Id.  
37 Id.  
38 Id.  
 
39 614 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2010).  
40 Id. at 795. 
41 Id.  
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users and a host computer; the site merely makes information available to people.”42  The 
court then turned to Calder, as discussed in Chapter 3, to finish its jurisdiction decision.43 
In each of the cases in which a court discussed Zippo and Calder as two parts of 
the same overall inquiry, the court declined to find jurisdiction based on the sliding scale 
of interactivity.  That fact raises the question of whether Zippo is useful at all in such a 
two-step approach for Internet defamation cases. None of the courts dealt with the key 
criticism of applying Zippo to Internet defamation: it leads to perverse results whereby 
the same, equally damning statement on two separate websites could lead to opposite 
jurisdiction decisions depending entirely on the character of the website and not the 
content of the message or the size or location of audience reached.  
Declining to Apply Zippo 
Several courts found the Zippo sliding scale inappropriate for use in Internet 
defamation cases, either because Calder provides the appropriate framework in libel or 
because they rejected the notion that a special standard should be created for Internet 
jurisdiction. In a short, unpublished opinion, Northwest Healthcare Alliance v. 
Healthgrades.com,44 the Ninth Circuit said it had adopted two separate frameworks for 
Internet jurisdiction cases: one based on the Zippo sliding scale and one based on 
Calder’s effects test.45 It then said the effects test is the appropriate framework for 
intentional torts and did not apply Zippo to that case because it was a defamation claim.46  
                                                 
42 Id.  
43 The court did not allow jurisdiction under an effects test theory either. Id. at 797.  
44 50 Fed. App’x 339 (9th Cir. 2002).  
45 Id. at 340.  
46 Id. at 341.  
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The Ohio Court of Appeals considered Zippo favorably in Kauffman Racing 
Equipment v. Roberts,47 a case involving an Ohio plaintiff and a Virginia defendant 
involved in a dispute over a car engine.48 The Ohio court significantly re-cast the “sliding 
scale” in terms of online commercial activity instead of website interactivity:  
The Internet makes it possible to conduct business throughout the world 
entirely from a desktop. With this global revolution looming in the 
horizon, the development of the law concerning the permissible scope of 
personal jurisdiction based on Internet use is in its infant stages. The cases 
are scant. Nevertheless, our review of the available cases and materials 
reveals that the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally 
exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial 
activity that an entity conducts over the Internet. This sliding scale is 
consistent with well-developed personal jurisdiction principles.49 
 
But the court did not apply this commercial activity scale to the case beyond 
acknowledging that the plaintiff operated a website to advertise his business.50 Instead, it 
turned to a version of the Calder effects test, as discussed in Chapter 3.  
On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court declined a Zippo analysis for jurisdiction in 
Kauffman Racing Equipment v. Roberts.51 The state supreme court found that the “Zippo 
model was developed in a commercial or business context and is factually distinct from 
this case. When the Internet activity in question ‘is non-commercial in nature, the Zippo 
analysis offers little to supplement the traditional framework for considering questions of 
                                                 
47 2008 Ohio 1922 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).  
48 Id. at ¶ 2-3.  
49 Id. at ¶ 30.  
50 Id. at ¶ 32-33.  
51 930 N.E. 2d 784 (Ohio 2010), cert denied Roberts v. Kauffman Racing Equip., No. 10-617, order (U.S. 
Jun. 28, 2011).  
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personal jurisdiction.’”52 So, even though the Ohio Court of Appeals viewed Zippo 
favorably, the rule in that jurisdiction is that it does not apply to disputes that are non-
commercial in nature, such as defamation.53 
 The North Dakota Supreme Court discussed the Zippo test in Wagner v. Miskin54 
but did not apply it because the record was too incomplete to make a determination of 
Internet-based jurisdiction.55 Both the plaintiff and defendant represented themselves at 
the supreme court, and neither was an attorney.56 Even though the court did not apply 
Zippo, it provided some insight into how it might view the relationship between Zippo 
and Calder.57 Instead of considering the two as compatible with each other, and perhaps 
part of the same two-step analysis, as the Fifth Circuit did in Revell, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court described their application as an either/or proposition.58 Then again, the 
discussion of each test was brief, less than a paragraph each.59 
The Seventh Circuit expressly declined to apply Zippo in an Internet defamation 
case, Tamburo v. Dworkin.60 In an extensive footnote, the court considered the sliding 
                                                 
52 Id. at 785 (quoting Oasis Corp. v. Judd, 132 F. Supp.2d 612, 622, fn.9 (S.D. Ohio 2001)).  
53 Id.  
54 660 N.W.2d 593 (N.D. 2003).  
55 Id. at 598 (“This Court has not previously had occasion to consider an Internet jurisdiction case. The 
present case lacking a complete transcript of the district court proceedings, does not provide us with a 
sufficient record to undertake such an analysis.”) 
56 Id. at 595.  
57 Id. at 598.  
58 Id.  
59 Id.  
60 601 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2010).  
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scale of interactivity and noted that several other courts have found its use appropriate 
when dealing with cases where jurisdiction was based on “electronic contacts.”61 The 
court, however, declined to apply Zippo saying, “As a more general matter, we hesitate to 
fashion a special jurisdictional test for Internet-based cases. Calder speaks directly to 
personal jurisdiction in intentional-tort cases; the principles articulated there can be 
applied to cases involving tortious conduct committed over the Internet.”62  Essentially, 
the court said that Calder’s effects test works fine for defamation cases, and it was not 
ready to create a special jurisdiction standard for the Internet.63 
The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey looked 
disapprovingly on the Zippo scale in Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg.64 That case involved New 
Jersey plaintiffs and a California defendant in a defamation suit over posts on an Internet 
newsgroup.65 The court did not reference Zippo directly but rather briefly discussed the 
passive-interactive sliding scale in a parenthetical note in which it favorably quoted 
Michael Geist’s argument that the test is inappropriate for defamation cases.66 “‘If the 
target is unable to sue locally due to a strict adherence to the passive versus active test, 
the law might be seen as encouraging online defamatory speech by creating a 
jurisdictional hurdle to launching a legal claim.’”67 
                                                 
61 Id. at 703, n.7.  
62 Id.  
63 Id.  
64 928 A.2d 948 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).  
65 Id. at 952.  
66 Id.  
67 Id. (quoting Michael A. Geist, Is There a There? Toward Greater Certainty For Internet Jurisdiction, 16 
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1345, 1377 (2001)). 
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 These cases show confusion about when Zippo should apply. Although each 
rejected the sliding scale’s application in the case before it, the reasons varied. Some, 
such as the Ohio Supreme Court, said that Zippo’s development in the commercial 
context precludes its use in a defamation case. Others, such as the Seventh Circuit, 
viewed Zippo as a special Internet jurisdiction test and were not prepared to adopt such a 
test. And then there’s the Ninth Circuit view that Calder should govern in Internet 
defamation cases because Calder was a defamation case while Zippo is appropriate for 
other types of Internet actions.  
Relying Primarily On Zippo  
A small number of courts found the sliding scale was not only appropriate but the 
only test necessary for determining jurisdiction in Internet defamation cases. The Indiana 
Court of Appeals used a Zippo-influenced framework in its first decision determining 
jurisdiction in an Internet libel case. The plaintiff in Conseco, Inc. v. Hickerson68 was an 
Indiana corporation that had subsidiary insurance companies and customers across the 
country.69 Conseco sued a Texas resident for libel, trademark infringement and tortious 
interference based on a website he maintained that accused one of the company’s 
subsidiaries of committing fraud.70  
After explicitly declining to follow the effects test from Calder v. Jones,71 the 
court adopted the Ninth Circuit’s analysis from Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.,72 a 
                                                 
68 698 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).  
69 Id. at 819.  
70 Id. at 817.  
71 Id. at 820.  
72 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).  
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trademark infringement case that relied on Zippo for the principle that the degree of 
website “interactivity” can be a factor in determining jurisdiction.73 The Cybersell 
application does not refer to the “sliding scale” that other courts have considered when 
utilizing Zippo. But it approvingly supports the end of the scale in which the jurisdiction 
analysis requires measuring the degree of website interactivity, the commercial nature of 
information being exchanged and additional forum contacts.74 The Indiana court, in 
applying this analysis, presumed the website was interactive based on an email link and 
then found that jurisdiction could not be conferred because there were no other forum 
contacts.  “We hold that Hickerson’s discussion of Conseco in his web site, without any 
other contacts, was not a minimum contact sufficient to allow Indiana to exercise 
personal jurisdiction over him.”75  
The Illinois Appellate Court relied primarily on Zippo to determine jurisdiction in 
an Internet defamation case arising out of a dispute between dog breeders.76 In Bombliss 
v. Cornelsen,77 the plaintiff was an Illinois-based breeder of Tibetan-mastiffs.78 The 
defendants were residents of Oklahoma.79 The plaintiffs, Ronald and Catherine Bombliss, 
purchased a dog from the defendants for breeding.80 A few months later one of the 
                                                 
73 Id. at 418, 420. 
74 Id. 
75 Conseco, Inc, 698 N.E.2d at 820.  
76 Bombliss v. Cornelsen, 824 N.E.2d 1175 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).  
77Id.  
78 Id. at 1177.  
79 Id. There was also a Washington state defendant in the initial complaint, but the plaintiffs did not appeal 
the trial court’s dismissal of jurisdiction against that defendant. Id.  
80 Id. 
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defendants, Anne Cornelson, began posting on a forum for dog breeders that she believed 
the litter suffered from genetic defects, and that none of the dogs – including the one 
purchased by the plaintiffs – should be used for breeding.81 The plaintiffs had their dog 
tested for genetic defects and none were revealed.82 The Bomblisses then filed a suit 
alleging defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.83 Their theory was that the defendants were knowingly posting false 
information about dogs in the litter as a way of retaliating against the owner of the sire 
for the litter and, in the process, impaired the good reputations of the Illinois plaintiffs.84 
The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, and the plaintiffs appealed 
on a theory that the Illinois courts had jurisdiction based on the defendant’s postings on 
Yahoo! message boards.85 
The appellate court gave a brief recitation of minimum contacts based on World-
Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson86 and Burger King Corporation v. Rudzewicz.87 It then 
looked favorably at Zippo for making minimum contacts determinations in Internet cases. 
“For ease of analysis, a ‘sliding scale’ approach has been adopted.”88 The court then 
                                                 
81 Id. at 1178.  
82 Id.  
83 Id.  
84 Id.  
85 Id.  
86 444 U.S. 286 (1980).  
87 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Bombliss, 824 N.E.2d at 1179-80.  
88 Bombliss, 824 N.E.2d at 1180 (quoting Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 
1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).  
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applied the sliding scale to two websites relevant to the case.89 The first was the 
defendants’ own website through which they advertised their puppies for sale and had 
information, including email addresses, for contacting the owners.90 The court found this 
website fell in the middle of the sliding scale in that it had some interactivity with the 
email address and it was commercial in nature.91 But it was not interactive enough to 
constitute “purposeful contacts” with Illinois on its own.92 The second website the court 
considered was the Yahoo! message board on which the allegedly defamatory posts were 
made.93 While the court never announced where it saw the message board falling on the 
scale, it found that the sale of a dog to an Illinois resident, the maintenance of a 
commercial, interactive website, and the use of the Yahoo! message board to reach 
potential customers were “of sufficient quantity and quality to constitute minimum 
contacts in Illinois.”94 After finding that the allegations arose out of those contacts, the 
court remanded the case for additional proceedings since jurisdiction was proper.95 
In Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker96 the Second Circuit utilized Zippo to inform its 
understanding of the New York long arm statute.97 The statute presents a higher bar than 
                                                 
89 Id. at 1180-81.  
90 Id. at 1180.  
91 Id.  
92 Id.  
93 Id.  
94 Id. at 1181.  
95 Id. at 1181-82.  
96 490 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2007).  
97 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(2) (McKinney 2009) 
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most for defamation claims. It appears on its face to bar jurisdiction in a defamation case 
over an out-of-state defendant who was speaking outside the state.98 But the New York 
courts have not interpreted the statute so rigidly.99 Under certain circumstances, the 
courts will consider defamatory remarks as “transacting business” within the state and 
allow a defamation case based on out-of-state speech by a non-resident to go forward.100 
But defamatory speech alone is not adequate to satisfy the “transacting business” 
requirement in the statute.101  
Thus, the courts use the forum contacts analysis in due process law to determine 
how far “transacting business” extends.102 The Second Circuit did precisely that in Best 
Van Lines:  
We think that a website’s interactivity may be useful for analyzing 
personal jurisdiction under [the New York long arm statute], but only 
insofar as it helps to decide whether the defendant “transacts any 
business” in New York – that is, whether the defendant, through the 
website, “purposefully avail[ed] himself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within New York, thus invoking the benefits and protections of 
its laws.”103 
 
The court was careful to point out that it did not view Zippo as providing a “separate 
framework” for Internet-based jurisdiction, but rather an informative tool for traditional 
                                                 
98 The statute states: “a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . . ., who in 
person or through an agent: 2. commits a tortious act within the state, expect as to a cause of action for 
defamation of character arising from the act.” Id.  
99 Best Van Lines, 490 F.3d at 245.   
100 Id. at 247 
101 Id.  
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 252 (quoting Cutco Indus. v. Naughton, 806 F.2d 361, 365 (2d Cr. 1986)).  
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analyses.104 In this case, the court found the website to be interactive, because the 
defendant had a section on it through which people could send him donations.105 But the 
defamation claims did not arise out of those donations, so there was no nexus between the 
forum contacts and the claims and, therefore, jurisdiction could not be sustained under 
the “transacting business” prong of the long arm statute.106 The court also took notice of 
Calder, but specifically noted that it would not be useful in informing the long-arm 
statute since the particular section of the long-arm to which it might be analogous 
specifically barred defamation claims.107 
 The Florida Court of Appeals relied heavily on Zippo’s sliding scale to determine 
jurisdiction in a trade libel case, Renaissance Health Publishing v. Resveratrol 
Partners,108 arising out of Internet activity. The plaintiff, Renaissance Health, sued 
Resveratrol Partners and one of its executives as an individual for trade libel based on 
statements from the defendants’ website.109 The plaintiff, a Florida company, and the 
defendants manufactured competing red wine extracts.110 The defendants made some 
disparaging remarks on their website about the plaintiff’s product, and a lawsuit was soon 
filed.111 The defendants were not Florida residents.112 The company was incorporated in 
                                                 
104 Id.  
105 Id. at 254.  
106 Id.  
107 Id. at 254, n.14.  
108 982 So. 2d 739 (Fla. Ct. App. 2008).  
109 Id. at 740.  
110 Id.  
111 Id. at 739. 
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Nevada with its principal place of business in California,113 but it actively sold products 
in Florida, which accounted for 2.4 percent of its overall business.114 
 The Florida court found the combination of an interactive website and having a 
significant portion of the company’s sales in that state were adequate to sustain 
jurisdiction.115 “An interactive website which allows a defendant to enter into contracts to 
sell products to Florida residents, and which ‘involve[s] the knowing and repeated 
transmission of computer files over the internet’ may support a finding of personal 
jurisdiction.”116 
 In Pearl v. Abshire,117 the Texas Court of Appeals issued a memorandum opinion 
in which it relied on the sliding scale of interactivity without directly referencing 
Zippo.118 The Texas-based plaintiff brought a libel claim against a New York resident 
who had been posting allegations of sexual harassment on a Yahoo! Finance message 
board.119 The court applied the sliding scale to determine purposeful availment, first 
deciding where on the scale the website fell.120 Because it was a message board, the court 
                                                                                                                                                 
112 Id.  
113 Id.  
114 Id. at 740. 
115 Id. at 742.  
116 Id. (quoting Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997)).  
117 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 5351 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009).  
118 Id.  
119 Id.  
120 Id. at *9.  
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found it was an interactive website and in the middle of the scale.121 That meant the court 
then had to determine the nature and degree of interaction between the defendant and the 
website.122 Jurisdiction could not be sustained because all of the defendant’s posts were 
in response to posts made by the plaintiff, who admitted he posted on the site for the 
purpose of getting a response.123 Therefore, the court said, it was “merely fortuitous” that 
the plaintiff was a Texas resident and the defendant did not purposefully avail himself of 
Texas law.124 
 The cases in which courts primarily relied on Zippo again indicate confusion, but 
this time about how the test should apply. In Renaissance Health Publishing, the Florida 
court applied the sliding scale to a clearly commercial context in a dispute between two 
rival wine extract sellers. The sales in Florida by the out-of-state defendants created 
additional contacts. But in a similar case, the Second Circuit said the tortious conduct – 
defamation – had to arise out of those contacts and wouldn’t sustain jurisdiction when the 
additional contacts had to do with solicitations for donations. These cases do little to help 
resolve the muddy state of personal jurisdiction law in Internet libel cases. 
Conclusion 
The Zippo framework is only moderately helpful, at best, in determining 
jurisdiction in Internet libel cases and, at worst, is prone to produce strange results. The 
cases discussed in this chapter show how odd its application can be. In Bombliss, the 
Illinois court used the sliding scale to uphold jurisdiction based on three factors: 1) the 
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defendant had sold a dog to a resident of the state, indicating an additional contact; 2) the 
defendant maintained an interactive website for her business – even though the tort 
claims had nothing to do with that website; and 3) the defendant had posted on an 
interactive message board.125 The interactivity scale here was used to draw in a largely 
irrelevant, additional website that was not connected to the basis for the claims. At the 
other end is Pearl in which the court found posting on an interactive website was 
adequate to then look at additional contacts.126 The defendant had none, so his sustained 
pattern of posting claims of sexual harassment against the plaintiff were not adequate to 
uphold jurisdiction on the sliding scale.127 
 The cases in which the courts do a two-step analysis, applying the sliding scale 
and then the effects test raise a serious question: What’s the purpose of applying the 
sliding scale in the first place? In every one of the cases in which the courts said the two 
should be applied in that order, the courts did not find enough interactivity or additional 
contacts to sustain jurisdiction. Since very few courts even reach the conclusion that 
Zippo is applicable, let alone to sustain jurisdiction, in Internet defamation cases, it 
should be abandoned in this context.  
 
                                                 
125 Bombliss v. Cornelsen, 824 N.E.2d 1175, 1181-82 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).  
126 Pearl v. Abshire, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 5351 (2009).  
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Chapter 5 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 The effects test from Calder v. Jones1 and the sliding scale from Zippo 
Manufacturing, Inc. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.2 are the two predominant tests that courts 
relied on when deciding jurisdiction in Internet defamation claims, but they are not the 
only considerations. A few courts chose not to apply either Calder or Zippo and went 
with other personal jurisdiction standards, and a few courts at least gave mention to First 
Amendment concerns in Internet defamation cases.  
The first part of this chapter will briefly discuss the small number of cases that 
relied on neither Calder’s effects test nor Zippo’s sliding scale of interactivity to 
determine jurisdiction in Internet libel cases. Part two will consider the lack of First 
Amendment discussion in the jurisdiction decisions. Part three briefly discusses the 
results of the research questions asked in this thesis. Part four argues for the inclusion of 
First Amendment consideration at the jurisdiction stage.  
Cases That Used Neither Effects Nor Interactivity 
In a small number of cases – five of the 35 studied – the court turned to some 
rationale other than Calder’s effects test or Zippo’s sliding scale of interactivity in order 
to decide jurisdiction in Internet defamation cases. The frameworks applied varied from 
                                                 
1 465 U.S. 783 (1984).  
2 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
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an analysis based on World-Wide Volkswagen Inc. v. Woodson3 and Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzecwiz’s4 purposeful availment construction to one relying on Asahi Metal Industry 
Co. v. Superior Court’s fairness principle.5  
In Johnson v. Schlotzky’s, Inc.6 the Texas Court of Appeals did not conduct an 
Internet contacts analysis, even though the allegedly defamatory statements were 
published on the Internet. The out-of-state defendant, Johnson, had been in a contractual 
relationship with the plaintiff, Schlotzky’s Inc., for 15 years.7 He held several franchising 
agreements to operate three Schlotzky’s restaurants in Nebraska for 15 years from 1984 
to 2001.8 Schlotzky’s was a Texas corporation.9 In the late 1990s the two sides began to 
differ about one of the agreements and ended up in court. While the matter was pending, 
a series of messages were posted in a Yahoo! Finance message board that were highly 
critical of Schlotzky’s and warned potential franchisees of doing business with the 
company.10 Schlotzky’s accused Johnson of posting the messages and sued in Texas for 
defamation, business disparagement, conspiracy and breach of confidentiality.11 Johnson 
consented to jurisdiction in Texas on breach of confidentiality because there was a forum 
                                                 
3 444 U.S. 286 (1980).  
4 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
5 480 U.S. 102 (1987) 
6 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 10566 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006).  
7 Id. 
8 Id.  
9 Id.  
10 Id. at 10566, *2.  
11 Id.  
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selection clause in the agreements he signed with the company, but he contested 
jurisdiction on the tort claims.12 
The appellate court found that the contract and the tort claims were so interwoven 
that jurisdiction was appropriate based on the forum selection clause.13 However, it also 
conducted a separate minimum contacts analysis and found that jurisdiction would be 
appropriate independent of the contract.14 The court did not conduct an effects test or 
apply the interactivity sliding scale, though, because it found Johnson had adequate 
contacts under the World-Wide Volkswagen and Burger King line of cases.15 Johnson had 
entered into contracts with a Texas company; he visited Texas as part of the business 
relationship; and he regularly sent payments to the company in Texas.16 
The Wyoming Supreme Court considered jurisdiction in a defamation case arising 
primarily out of email in Cheyenne Publishing, LLC v. Starostka.17 The plaintiff was a 
Wyoming publisher, and the defendant was a Nebraska artist who had entered into an 
agreement to have her work featured in a catalogue published by the company.18 The 
relationship soured. The company claimed Starostka defamed it when she contacted other 
artists “via e-mail, internet, telephone and written correspondence,” but it never laid out 
                                                 
12 Id.  
13 Id. at 10566, *9.  
14 Id.  
15 Id.  
16 Id. at 10566, *13.  
17 94 P.3d 463 (Wy. 2004).  
18 Id. at 465-66.  
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what the allegedly defamatory statements were.19 Starostka claimed that the only contacts 
she made to anyone in Wyoming were with the plaintiff and with the state attorney 
general’s office to complain about the company.20 All of the artists she contacted lived in 
other states.21 The court conducted a traditional forum contacts analysis focusing on the 
contract between the two, which was formed in Nebraska, and said that jurisdiction was 
improper based on the lack of any other contracts with Wyoming.22 
The Tennessee Court of Appeals forged its own framework for jurisdiction in 
Internet defamation cases in Hibdon v. Grabowski.23 The plaintiff, Kerry Hibdon, was a 
Tennessee jet-ski watercraft mechanic who had been featured in several jet-ski enthusiast 
magazine articles for the speeds he was able to get the machines to reach.24 The 
defendants posted critical messages about Hibdon on a jet-ski enthusiast newsgroup.25 
Two of the defendants were Ohio residents, and they contested jurisdiction in 
Tennessee.26 
The court conducted a brief jurisdiction analysis relying on the World-Wide 
Volkswagen and Burger King line of cases.27 The court then found that the defendants 
                                                 
19 Id. at 466.  
20 Id. at 467.  
21 Id.  
22 Id. at 473.  
23 195 S.W.3d 48 (2005).  
24 Id. at 52-54.  
25 Id. at 54.  
26 Id.  
27 Id. at 69-71.  
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had purposefully availed themselves of Tennessee laws by virtue of having sent messages 
to a forum read by Tennessee residents. “In the present case, Grabowski and Pace 
personally directed many of their Internet messages to residents of Tennessee, 
specifically fellow defendants.”28 Without explaining what characteristics of the 
messages indicated they were directed at Tennessee, the court sustained jurisdiction.29 
The Arizona Court of Appeals relied on Asahi to reject jurisdiction in Austin v. 
Crystaltech Web Hosting.30 The plaintiff in Austin was a resident of Bali. There were 
three defendants: an Arizona-based Internet hosting service, a Bali resident and a Bali 
corporation.31 The Bali defendants competed with the plaintiff in selling travel tours to 
Indonesia.32 The Arizona-based company, which hosted the Bali defendants’ website on 
which the allegedly defamatory statements appeared, was dismissed as immune under 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996.33  
Once the hosting service was removed, the court was left with a Bali plaintiff 
suing two Bali defendants. It applied Asahi’s principle that the “exercise of jurisdiction 
would be unreasonable and unfair in light of the ‘serious burdens on [the] alien defendant 
[which were] outweighed by the minimal interests on the part of the plaintiff or the forum 
                                                 
28 Id. at 71.  
29 Id.  
30 125 P.3d 389 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).  
31 Id. at 391.  
32 Id.  
33 Id. at 573-74. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2010).  
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State.’”34 Arizona had “no real interest” in resolving the case between two Bali 
competitors.35 
The Florida Court of Appeal gave little explanation for its assertion of jurisdiction 
in Price v. Kronenberger,36 a very brief opinion. Both the defendant and the plaintiff had 
been members of the Korean War Veteran’s Association.37 After being expelled from the 
group, the defendant, an Illinois resident, sent an email to other members of the group 
throughout the country disparaging the plaintiff.38 The plaintiff sued for defamation in 
Florida. After a short discussion of the state’s long-arm statute, the court held that “[b]y 
publishing the e-mail in Florida and directing the defamatory comments at a Florida 
resident, Kronenberger established minimum contacts with this state.”39 The court cited 
two of its own precedents dealing with a television interview taped in Washington, D.C., 
that was aired in Florida40 and with letters that were sent to Florida41 without explaining 
the principle behind its decision to find jurisdiction.42 
 
 
                                                 
34 Id. at 575 (quoting Asahi, 480 U.S. at 115-16).   
35 Id. at 575.  
36 24 So. 3d 775 (Fla. Ct. App. 2009).  
37 Id. at 776.  
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Smith v. Cuban Am. Nat’l Found., 657 So. 2d 86 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995).  
41 Silver v. Levinson, 648 So. 2d 240, 243-44 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994).  
42 Price, 24 So. 3d at 776.  
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First Amendment Considered in Jurisdiction Cases 
 That very few courts took First Amendment considerations into account 
during the jurisdiction analysis is not surprising. After all, the Supreme Court looked 
unfavorably on adding a First Amendment analysis to jurisdiction in Calder.43  
The infusion of such considerations would needlessly complicate 
an already imprecise inquiry. Moreover, the potential chill on 
protected First Amendment activity stemming from libel and 
defamation cases is already taken into account in the constitutional 
limitations on the substantive law governing such suits. To 
reintroduce those concerns at the jurisdictional stage would be a 
form of double counting.44 
 
Yet, the Supreme Court’s announcement was made in dictum and not in the substantive 
analysis of Calder, meaning a court that chose to tackle First Amendment principles 
would not be bound by that decision.   
 Of the 35 cases studied in this thesis, First Amendment issues were raised in only 
four decisions.45 In two of those cases, the First Amendment consideration was related to 
a companion issue on appeal and not jurisdiction in the Internet defamation claim.46 In 
the two remaining cases, one court cited the Calder dictum while dismissing First 
                                                 
43 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1984). 
44 Id. at 790 (citations omitted, emphasis in original). 
45 See Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 298-99 (3d Cir. 2007); Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. 
Roberts, 930 N.E.2d 784, 800 (Ohio 2010) (O’Donnell, J., dissenting); Hibdon v. Grabowski, 195 S.W.3d 
48, 56-69 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); Griffis v. Luban, 633 N.W.2d 548, 553 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d, 646 
N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002).  
46 See Marten, 499 F.3d at 298-99 (finding that the plaintiff had failed to show targeted conduct sufficient 
for jurisdiction over a First Amendment retaliation claim); Hibdon, 195 S.W.3d at 56-69 (discussing 
substantive libel law and First Amendment principles in review of a summary judgment dismissal of 
defamation claims).   
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Amendment consideration,47 and in the last case it was discussed only by the dissent and 
briefly.48 
 The Minnesota Court of Appeals First Amendment discussion in Griffis v. Luban 
was quite brief.49 Griffis involved a defamation claim brought by an Alabama resident 
against a Minnesota resident in Alabama court.50 The defendant had disparaged the 
plaintiff’s credentials to teach a college course in an Internet newsgroup.51 After winning 
in Alabama state court a default judgment of $25,000 and an injunction prohibiting the 
defendant from disparaging her credentials, the plaintiff went to Minnesota to enforce the 
judgment.52 The defendant contested the Alabama court’s jurisdiction in a collateral 
attack in Minnesota.53  
The court briefly discussed the injunction: “Appellant also argues that the 
injunction violates the First Amendment. Because of this alleged illegality, appellant 
argues that the district court erred when it found in favor of respondent. The First 
Amendment plays no role in jurisdictional analysis.”54 It went on to say that because the 
Minnesota trial court had not made a decision on the First Amendment issue, it wasn’t 
                                                 
47 Griffis, 633 N.W.2d at 553.  
48 Kauffman Racing Equip., 930 N.E.2d at 800 (O’Donnell, J., dissenting).  
49 Griffis, 633 N.W.2d at 553.  
50 Id. at 549.  
51 Id. at 550 
52 Id.  
53 Id.  
54 Id. at 553.  
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properly before the appellate court.55 The Minnesota Supreme Court later reversed the 
appellate court’s jurisdiction decision without discussing the First Amendment issues.56 
Ohio Supreme Court Justice Terrence O’Donnell also gave the First Amendment 
a brief discussion in his Kauffman Racing Equipment v. Roberts dissent.57 O’Donnell 
noted that the parties had not briefed and the court did not address First Amendment 
concerns because it was at the jurisdiction stage. “The Supreme Court of the United 
States in Calder ‘rejected the suggested that First Amendment concerns enter into the 
jurisdictional analysis [and] declined . . . to grant special procedural protections to 
defendants in libel and defamation actions in addition to the constitutional protections 
embodied in the substantive laws.’”58  Kauffman Racing grew out of a dispute between an 
Ohio engine manufacturer and a customer in Virginia.59 The customer had never been to 
Ohio and his only contacts with the state were the business transaction he entered into 
with Kauffman Racing and some comments he posted about the company on the 
website.60 Applying the Calder effects test, the Ohio Supreme Court majority said his 
posts to several auto enthusiast forums and the online auction site eBay were adequate to 
satisfy due process.61 
                                                 
55 Id.  
56 Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002). See supra Chapter 3 notes 63-84 and accompanying 
text.  
57 930 N.E.2d 784, 800 (Ohio 2010), cert denied Roberts v. Kauffman Racing Equip., No. 10-617, order 
(U.S. Jun. 28, 2011) (O’Donnell, J., dissenting).  
58 Id. (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984)).  
59 Id. at 787. 
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 798.  
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Justice O’Donnell, in dissent, expressed concern about the effect the majority’s 
broad jurisdiction interpretation would have on speech. “[T]he practical impact of the 
majority’s holding in this case is to unnecessarily chill the exercise of free speech.”62 
 Finally, in a related case the Florida Supreme Court rejected First Amendment 
considerations when they were raised as a challenge to the state’s long-arm statute.63 In 
Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall,64 the court did not have a constitutional due process 
decision in front of it.65 The case arrived in the Florida Supreme Court in an unusual 
procedural posture. The federal Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question 
about how to interpret the state’s long-arm statute to aid its review of a federal district 
court opinion.66 The case involved a Florida corporation suing a Washington state 
blogger for defamation based on a review she had posted calling one of its products a 
“fraud.”67  
At the Florida Supreme Court the defendant attacked the application of the long-
arm statute as a violation of First Amendment speech protections.68 The Florida court 
disagreed, citing Calder’s dictum.  “As explained by the U.S. Supreme Court, ‘the 
                                                 
62 Id. at 800 (O’Donnell, J., dissenting).  
63 Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. 2010). This case falls outside the research 
methodology for this thesis because it is a long-arm statute decision and not a due process decision. It’s 
discussed here because of the dearth of due process personal jurisdiction cases addressing the First 
Amendment and its usefulness in explaining one court’s reluctance to apply First Amendment principles to 
an analysis that is closely connected to personal jurisdiction under due process. The case also relies on due 
process decisions for the rule that First Amendment considerations should not be undertaken at the 
jurisdiction stage.  
64 Id. at 1202 
65 Id.  
66 Id. 
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 1215.  
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potential chill on protected First Amendment activity stemming from libel and 
defamation actions is already taken into account in the constitutional limitations on the 
substantive law governing such suits.’”69 
 These cases clearly state one rule: Courts will not apply First Amendment 
protections to jurisdiction questions. They find the basis for that rule in Calder and 
adhere closely to it. This may be for reasons of judicial economy – as the Supreme Court 
seems to believe taking speech principles into account at the jurisdiction stage and in the 
substantive law of defamation would be a form of double counting. It could also be a 
desire to allow defamation cases to move past the jurisdiction stage and into discovery 
without cutting off a forum for an aggrieved party. Whatever the reason, courts are 
clearly reluctant to head down that path. 
 Results: Calder, Zippo and the First Amendment 
 This thesis sought to answer three basic questions about how courts deciding 
Internet defamation determined personal jurisdiction when the defendant was not a state 
resident. The research identified 35 cases where appellate courts made jurisdiction 
decisions based on due process considerations.  
1) Did courts utilize the Calder effects test? If so, how did they apply it? Was it 
the sole standard used to determine jurisdiction? If they did not use the Calder 
effects test, did they acknowledge it and/or explain their decisions to use a 
different standard? 
Thirteen of the cases relied solely on Calder or another case restating the effects 
test,70 three considered Calder but declined to apply the effects test71 and twelve applied 
                                                 
69 Id.  
70 Silver v. Brown, 382 Fed. App’x 723 (10th Cir. 2010); Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2007); 
Ouazzani-Chadi v. Greensboro News & Record, Inc., 200 Fed. App’x 289 (5th Cir. 2006); Young v. New 
Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002); Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002); Blakey v. 
Continental Airlines, 751 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2000); Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W. 3d 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 
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Calder while considering other tests.72 The courts that applied Calder generally fell into 
one of two general categories: those taking a broad view of the effects test that allows for 
a wide application of jurisdiction and those taking a narrow view that restricts jurisdiction 
in many Internet defamation cases.  
2) Did courts utilize the Zippo sliding scale test? If so, how did they apply it? Was 
it the sole standard used to determine jurisdiction? If they did not use the Zippo 
test, did they acknowledge it and/or explain their decisions to use a different 
standard?  
Zippo’s sliding scale was rejected outright by five courts deciding jurisdiction in 
Internet defamation cases,73 applied as the primary test by five courts74 and used in 
conjunction with the Calder effects test by six more.75 The courts rejecting Zippo did so 
                                                                                                                                                 
2010); Dailey v. Popma, 662 S.E. 2d 12 (N.C. App. 2008); Nygard v. Aller Jukaisat Oy, 2005 Cal. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 1375 (2005); Rambam v. Prytulak, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 12 (2004); Novak v. 
Benn, 896 So.2d 513 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004); Griffis v. Luban, 633 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), 
rev’d, 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002); Blakey v. Continental Airlines, 730 A.2d 854 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1999) rev’d,  751 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2000).  
71 Wagner v. Mishkin, 660 N.W.2d 593 (N.D. 2003); Renaissance Health Publishing v. Resveratrol 
Partners, 982 So.2d 739 (Fla. Ct. App. 2008); Conseco, Inc. v. Hickerson, 698 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1998).  
72 Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2010); Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2010); The 
Cadle Company v. Schlictmann, 123 Fed. App’x 675 (6th Cir. 2005); Northwest Healthcare Alliance v. 
Healthgrades.com, 50 Fed. App’x 339 (9th Cir. 2002); Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002); 
Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, 930 N.E.2d 784 (Ohio 2010); Kauffman Racing Equip., 
L.L.C. v. Roberts, 2008 Ohio 1922 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 928 A.2d 954 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007); Nam Tai Electronices v. Titzer, 93 Cal. App. 4th 1301 (2001); Rambam v. 
Luhta, 2001 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1143 (2001); Jewish Defense Org., Inc. v. Superior Court of L.A. 
County, 72 Cal. App. 4th 1045 (1999).   
73 Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2010); Northwest Healthcare Alliance v. Healthgrades.com, 
50 Fed. App’x 339 (9th Cir. 2002); Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, 930 N.E.2d 784 (Ohio 
2010);Wagner v. Mishkin, 660 N.W.2d 593 (N.D. 2003); Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 928 A.2d 954 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).  
74 Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2007); Pearl v. Abshire, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 
5351 (2009); Renaissance Health Publishing v. Resveratrol Partners, 982 So.2d 739 (Fla. Ct. App. 2008); 
Bombliss v. Cornelsen, 824 N.E.2d 1175 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Conseco, Inc. v. Hickerson, 698 N.E.2d 816 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1998).  
75 Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2010); The Cadle Company v. Schlictmann, 123 Fed. App’x 
675 (6th Cir. 2005); Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002); Nam Tai Electronices v. Titzer, 93 Cal. 
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either because they did not think it was appropriate to create a special Internet jurisdiction 
test or because they considered Calder to be more appropriate in defamation cases.  
3) Did courts give any consideration to First Amendment speech protections in 
deciding jurisdiction issues?  
 Few courts considered First Amendment principles while discussing jurisdiction 
in Internet defamation cases. Only two courts mentioned the First Amendment during a 
due process discussion,76 and in both instances the court relied on Calder’s dictum for the 
principle that the First Amendment should not be applied at that stage.  
The Case for First Amendment Inclusion 
Kauffman Racing provides a good example of why excluding First Amendment 
concerns at the jurisdiction stage is potentially dangerous to speech.77 At its root, 
Kauffman Racing is a dispute between a merchant and an upset customer. The customer 
chooses to voice his concern about what he perceives to be a poor quality product on the 
Internet. This kind of complaint has become common in the Internet Age. The harm to 
the plaintiff is apparently minimal. Less than a half-dozen Ohioans read the posts, the 
worst of which claimed that the plaintiff was “less than honorable.”78 And the defendant 
had few connections to Ohio and showed little intent to reach an Ohio audience.  
He may very well have had a good defense had the case gone to trial, but the 
cost of litigation was mounting after fighting the jurisdiction question through three 
                                                                                                                                                 
App. 4th 1301 (2001); Rambam v. Luhta, 2001 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1143 (2001); Jewish Defense 
Org., Inc. v. Superior Court of L.A. County, 72 Cal. App. 4th 1045 (1999).   
76 930 N.E.2d 784, 800 (Ohio 2010) (O’Donnell, J., dissenting); Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 
2002).  
77 Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, 930 N.E.2d 784 (Ohio 2010), cert denied Roberts v. 
Kauffman Racing Equip., No. 10-617, order (U.S. Jun. 28, 2011). .  
78 Id. at 789.  
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courts. By leaving the First Amendment analysis to later in the litigation, the Ohio 
court left Roberts with a difficult choice: continue racking up legal bills until reaching 
the free speech vindication or settle.  
Contrary to the dicta in Calder, a First Amendment analysis at the 
jurisdictional stage should be appropriate.  At the early stages of litigation, before any 
evidence has been presented or any discovery conducted, courts consider a plaintiff’s 
pleadings as factual in determining questions of law. Making sure that a defamation 
claim, as pleaded, can pass First Amendment muster at the jurisdictional stage doesn’t 
serve to complicate an inquiry; rather it serves as a safety valve to ensure that 
protected speech is not being needlessly infringed. As Stein argued, “[C]ourts need to 
be cautious in assuming the validity of a plaintiff’s assertion of malicious conduct. 
Defamation is a particularly bad candidate for such an assumption, given its potential 
chilling effects on protected speech outside of the forum.”79 
 The two crucial elements that tend to determine libel cases are falsity and 
fault. The requisite level of fault is determined by the status of the plaintiff as a public 
official, public figure or private figure.80 Falsity comes into play whenever the 
statements at issue involve public concerns.81 Introducing a First Amendment 
analysis into the jurisdiction question would provide protection on both elements by 
                                                 
79 Allan R. Stein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due Process Through the Lens of 
Regulatory Precision, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 411, 447 (2004). 
80 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
280 (1964). In Sullivan the Court raised the fault standard in libel cases where the plaintiff is a “public 
figure” to “actual malice,” which it defined as a statement made “with knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 80. Gertz  extended the actual 
malice standard to anyone qualifying as a public figure and to determine that the court looks to the 
plaintiff’s “pervasive fame or notoriety” or whether “an individual voluntarily injects himself . . . into a 
particular public controversy.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351. 
81 Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).  
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ensuring that the plaintiff, at a bare minimum, was able to plead a case that was likely 
to survive summary judgment.  
 For example, a public official wishing to sue an out-of-state newspaper for 
libel would have to include in his pleadings an allegation of a false statement of fact 
made with actual malice. If he could not, or failed to, plead the necessary elements of 
an actual malice showing, then the defendant newspaper would not have to be subject 
to the expense of litigating through pre-trial motions before ultimately winning on 
summary judgment. The only purpose of allowing the entire exercise to proceed 
without a prima facie showing of potential success is to subject the newspaper to 
harassing litigation in a distant forum. On the other hand, a private figure plaintiff 
most likely would not have a difficult time getting his case through the First 
Amendment portion of a jurisdictional analysis because he merely must plead that a 
falsehood has been published about him negligently. Thus, a requirement at the 
jurisdictional analysis stage that the plaintiff be able to make a prima facie case that 
would withstand First Amendment scrutiny would serve to protect only those who 
choose to comment on public officials and figures from being needlessly harassed in 
another jurisdiction by a plaintiff who ultimately has little chance of success.  
  Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps82 helps illuminate how a First 
Amendment protection would help with the falsity element. In Hepps, the Supreme 
Court held that when an allegedly libelous statement involves a matter of public 
concern, libel plaintiffs, both public and private, must prove the falsity of the 
                                                 
82 475 U.S. 767 (1986).  
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statements in order to prevail.83  “To ensure that true speech on matters of public 
concern is not deterred, we hold that the common-law presumption that defamatory 
speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant 
for speech of public concern.”84 The essential point was that giving the burden to the 
defendant to prove the truth of his statements would harm the flow of speech. Thus, 
requiring a plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of his libel case at the 
jurisdictional stage would also include some pleadings about the falsity of the 
statements he is claiming are defamatory if the subject of the statements was a matter 
of public concern. That necessarily would require the plaintiff to plead the allegedly 
defamatory statements with specificity if the jurisdiction he was in did not already 
require it under the rules of civil procedure.   
 Applying that framework to Tamburo v. Dworkin85 shows how that standard 
would work. In Tamburo the plaintiff was a dog breeder accused of stealing data from 
other dog breeders’ publicly available websites.86 In order to survive jurisdiction, 
Tamburo would simply have to plead facts about the falsity of the statements, i.e., 
where he got the data from. The burden on the plaintiff is relative low at pleading, but 
raising the bar even slightly could help prevent harassing litigation. A requirement at 
                                                 
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 776-77.While the Hepps court did not decide whether the same standard applied to cases involving 
nonmedia defendants, many lower courts have found that in cases of private plaintiffs-public concern the 
falsity standard is applicable. See Flamm v. American Ass’n of Univ. Women, 210 F.3d 144, 149 (2nd Cir. 
2000); Burroughs v. FFP Operating Partners, L.P., 28 F.3d 543, 549 (5th Cir. 1994); In re IBP Confidential 
Business Documents Litig., 797 F.2d 632, 644 (8th Cir. 1986); Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 664 F. 
Supp. 1490, 1511 (D.D.C. 1987);Nizam-Aldine v. City of Oakland, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781, 786 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1996); Kahn v. Bower, 284 Cal. Rptr. 244, 249 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Ayala v. Washington, 679 A.2d 
1057, 1062-63 (D.C. Ct. App. 1996). 
85 601 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2010).  
86 Id. at 697.  
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the jurisdictional analysis stage that the plaintiff be able to make a prima facie case 
that would withstand First Amendment scrutiny could provide some degree of 
protection to those who choose to comment on public officials, public figures and 
matters of public concern from being harassed in another state by a plaintiff who has 
no chance of success.  
 The Danger of Bringing Back Common Law Malice 
 When the question of jurisdiction turns on the intent of the defendant to cause 
harm in a specific forum, the analysis allows the reintroduction of common law 
malice.  In the New York Times v. Sullivan,87 the Court set out a new standard of fault 
in libel cases brought by public officials: actual malice. The Court defined actual 
malice as publishing a statement “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not.”88 Without this heightened standard to 
protect speech, 
would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing 
their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even 
though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved 
in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to 
make only statements which “steer far wider of the unlawful 
zone.” . . . The rule [strict liability] thus dampens the vigor and 
limits the variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments.89  
 
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. the Court extended the actual malice standard to 
anyone who qualifies as a public figure.90 To determine public figure status, the Court 
                                                 
87 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  
88  i at 280.  
89 Id. at 279.  
90 418 U.S. 323 (1974).  
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said judges should look to the plaintiff’s “pervasive fame or notoriety” or whether “an 
individual voluntarily injects himself . . . into a particular public controversy.”91  
 At common law, malice is “1. The intent, without justification or excuse, to 
commit a wrongful act. 2. Reckless disregard of the law or of a person’s legal 
rights.”92 The difference between actual malice, as defined by Sullivan and common-
law malice is the nature of intent. Actual malice requires an intent to knowingly or 
recklessly publish a falsehood. That’s a higher standard than what is created by 
common law malice, which, in essence, involves an intent to harm. In looking at the 
relationship between the two, the D.C. Circuit said, “It is clear . . . that common law 
malice is not the equivalent of actual malice in the defamation context, and that 
common law malice alone will not support a finding of actual malice.”93  
 While the Calder test is essentially an “effects” test,94 it calls for an inquiry 
into the intent of the defendant.  In Calder, the Court included the intent of the 
defendants to cause harm in the forum state as part of its determination: “[T]heir 
intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were expressly aimed at California. . . . 
And they knew that the brunt of that injury would be felt be respondent in the State in 
which she lives and works.”95 Yet when the Court rejected the First Amendment 
analysis at the jurisdictional stage, while citing the speech protections afforded libel 
                                                 
91 Id. at 351.  
92 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 976 (8th ed. 2004).  
93Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 
389 U.S. 81, 82, 88 S. Ct. 197 (1967) (per curiam); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357, 85 S. Ct. 992 
(1965) (per curiam)). 
94 See supra Chapter 3.  
95 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984). 
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defendants in Sullivan and Gertz, it did not acknowledge that it was potentially 
creating two different intent inquiries in some libel cases.   
 The result is that in defamation cases in which the actual malice standard will 
be involved, courts must look at intent twice and use two different standards. For 
jurisdictional analysis, under Calder, the court analyzes whether the defendant knew 
that the allegedly defamatory statement would cause the brunt of its harm in the 
forum state.96 Then using the First Amendment — much later in the litigation — 
either the court or jury returns to the defendant’s intent to determine whether he knew 
the statement was false or was reckless in his disregard for whether it was true or 
false.97 This scheme is an inefficient use of judicial resources. A case that is clearly 
destined for dismissal at the summary judgment stage because the plaintiff is a public 
figure and has not pleaded sufficient facts to prove actual malice may still proceed 
past jurisdictional analysis and into discovery. A single inquiry into intent is both 
more efficient and provides appropriate protection for speech that fulfills First 
Amendment values. Stein rightfully argues:  
 To the extent that jurisdiction is dependent upon the malicious 
intent of defendant to cause injury in the forum, courts ought to 
test the factual sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claim on the merits at 
this stage, including proof that defendant acted with “actual 
malice” and the underlying statement is, in fact, false. Courts that 
have sustained jurisdiction in libel cases have not taken this burden 
seriously.98 
 
 
                                                 
96 Id. at 789.  
97 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).  
98 Stein, supra note 74, at 448. 
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Conclusion 
The U.S. Supreme Court should clarify how the Calder effects test is to be 
applied in defamation cases and should reject application of the Zippo sliding scale. 
When applied to Internet defamation, the Zippo sliding scale of interactivity irrationally 
focuses on the nature and character of the website. Neither of those considerations has 
any bearing on how damaging a defamatory statement may be to an individual’s 
reputation nor whether the defendant intended to avail himself or herself of a particular 
forum. On the other hand, lower courts have applied the Calder effects test to Internet 
defamation in confusing and contradictory ways. Some courts have read it to require the 
defendant intentionally targeted of the forum itself as well as had knowledge the plaintiff 
would feel the harm there.99 Others have read it in a much broader sense so that it allows 
jurisdiction if a defendant knows the plaintiff lives in the forum and targets the plaintiff 
and someone in the forum other than the plaintiff reads it.100 
When the Court revisits personal jurisdiction in the defamation context it should 
be in an Internet case. Because the Internet functions differently than traditional media, 
the balancing of factors the Court did in Calder becomes more difficult. The Calder 
Court specifically noted that the National Enquirer circulated a large number of copies in 
California – 600,000 – and that it was the state in which the publication had its highest 
circulation. That the reporter and editor working on the story knew the newspaper would 
have an extended reach in California was an important element of conferring jurisdiction 
there. Determining the geographic location of readers on the Internet is much more 
                                                 
99 See Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002). 
100 See Kauffman Racing Equip. L.L.C. v. Roberts, 930 N.E.2d 784 (Ohio 2010).  
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difficult. Predicting where a particular article will have its highest readership is also 
difficult in the Internet age.  For example, a small North Carolina community newspaper 
that posts its stories on the Internet might expect its highest readership in the state. Its 
news is local. But if it posts a story that has a particularly captivating, compelling or 
humorous narrative, the story could easily go viral through social media links and end up 
having its highest readership in New York or California. How does one apply the 
readership factors in Calder to a story published on the Internet? An editor or reporter has 
no reasonable expectation that the audience will be in one particular state or reach a 
certain number of readers. 
When the Court revisits Calder, it should also repudiate its dictum that First 
Amendment principles are not applicable to the jurisdiction decision. Asking a plaintiff to 
at least plead adequate facts to pass First Amendment scrutiny in a jurisdiction decision is 
not a form of double counting, as the Calder Court asserted. Rather it serves as a 
prophylactic measure to prevent courts from exercising broad jurisdiction that ultimately 
inhibits robust public debate, as the Ohio court did in Kauffman Racing.  
137 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Primary Sources: Cases 
U.S. Supreme Court 
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).  
Boswell’s Lessee v. Otis, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 336 (1850). 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).  
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).  
Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308 (1870). 
Crapo v. Kelly, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 610 (1872). 
Creighton v. Kerr, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 8 (1873). 
Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290 (1866). 
D’Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850). 
Elliott v. Lessee Perisol, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 328 (1828). 
Goodyear Luxemburg Tires, SA v. Brown, No. 10-76, slip op. (U.S. Jun. 27, 2011).  
 
Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350 (1873). 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).  
Hampton v. M’Connel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234 (1818). 
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
Harris v. Hardeman, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 334 (1852). 
Hart v. Sansom, 110 U.S. 151 (1884)  
Harvey v. Tyler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 328 (1864).  
Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965) (per curiam). 
Hess v. Pawkloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).  
Insurance Co. v. Bangs, 103 U.S. 435 (1880)  
International Shoe Inc. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, No. 09-1343, slip op. (U.S. Jun. 27, 2011).  
138 
 
 
Jeter v. Hewitt, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 352 (1859). 
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984).  
 
Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1919).  
 
Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855). 
 
Lessee of Grignon v. Astor, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 319 (1844). 
 
M’Elmoyle v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839). 
 
Mayhew v. Thatcher, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 129 (1821). 
 
Miller v. Sherry, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 237 (1864). 
 
Mills v. Duryee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813).  
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950).  
 
Nations v. Johnson, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 195 (1860). 
  
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  
 
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).  
 
Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).  
Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).  
Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189 (1915) 
Sargeant v. State Bank of Ind., 53 U.S. (12 How.) 371 (1851). 
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).  
Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1873). 
Travelers Health Association v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).  
Tyler v. Defrees, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 331 (1870). 
Voorhees v. Jackson, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 449 (1836). 
Williamson v. Berry, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 495 (1850). 
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).  
 
 
139 
 
Federal Courts 
ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002).  
Ayala v. Washington, 679 A.2d 1057, 1062-63 (D.C. Ct. App. 1996). 
Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2007).  
Burroughs v. FFP Operating Partners, L.P., 28 F.3d 543, 549 (5th Cir. 1994). 
The Cadle Company v. Schlictmann, 123 Fed. App’x 675 (6th Cir. 2005).  
Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997).  
Flamm v. American Ass’n of Univ. Women, 210 F.3d 144, 149 (2nd Cir. 2000) 
In re IBP Confidential Business Documents Litig., 797 F.2d 632, 644 (8th Cir. 1986) 
Imo Industries, Inc. v. Keikert, 155 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 1998).  
Internet Solutions Corporation v. Marshall, Order, Case No. 6:07-cv-1740 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 
2010) 
Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. 2010).  
Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2007).  
 
Northwest Healthcare Alliance v. Healthgrades.com, 50 Fed. App’x 339 (9th Cir. 2002).  
 
Ouazzani-Chadi v. Greensboro News & Record, Inc., 200 Fed. App’x 289 (5th Cir. 2006).  
 
Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).  
 
Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1490, 1511 (D.D.C. 1987). 
 
Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002).  
Silver v. Brown, 382 Fed. App’x 723 (10th Cir. 2010).  
Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 2010).  
Tavoulareas v. Piro, 759 F.2d 90, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1985)  
Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002). 
Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997) 
 
State Supreme Courts 
Blakey v. Continental Airlines, 751 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2000).  
140 
 
Cheyenne Publishing, LLC v. Starostka, 94 P.3d 463 (Wy. 2004).  
Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002).  
Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, 930 N.E.2d 784 (Ohio 2010), cert. denied, Roberts 
v. Kauffman Racing Equp., No. 10-617, order (U.S. Jun. 28, 2011).  
Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 4th 262 (2002). 
 
Wagner v. Mishkin, 660 N.W.2d 593 (N.D. 2003).  
 
State Courts 
Austin v. CrystalTech Web Hosting, 125 P.3d 389 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).  
Baldwin v. Fischer-Smith, 315 S.W. 3d 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010).  
Blakey v. Continental Airlines, 730 A.2d 854 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) rev’d,  751 A.2d 
538 (N.J. 2000).  
Bombliss v. Cornelsen, 824 N.E.2d 1175 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).  
Conseco, Inc. v. Hickerson, 698 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).  
Dailey v. Popma, 662 S.E. 2d 12 (N.C. App. 2008).  
Goldhaber v. Kohlenberg, 928 A.2d 954 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).  
Griffis v. Luban, 633 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d, 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002).  
Hibdon v. Grabowski, 195 S.W.3d 48 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).  
Internet Solutions Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So. 3d 1201 (Fla. 2010).  
Jewish Defense Org., Inc. v. Superior Court of L.A. County, 72 Cal. App. 4th 1045 (1999).  
Johnson v. Schlotzky’s Inc, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 10566 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006).  
Kahn v. Bower, 284 Cal. Rptr. 244, 249 (1991). 
Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, 2008 Ohio 1922 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).  
Nam Tai Electronices v. Titzer, 93 Cal. App. 4th 1301 (2001). 
 
Nizam-Aldine v. City of Oakland, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 781, 786 (1996). 
 
Novak v. Benn, 896 So.2d 513 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004).  
 
Nygard v. Aller Jukaisat Oy, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1375 (2005).  
 
141 
 
Pearl v. Abshire, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 5351 (2009). 
  
Price v. Kronenberger, 24 So. 3d 775 (Fla. Ct. App. 2009).  
Rambam v. Luhta, 2001 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1143 (2001).   
Rambam v. Prytulak, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 12 (2004).  
Renaissance Health Publishing v. Resveratrol Partners, 982 So.2d 739 (Fla. Ct. App. 2008).  
 
Primary Sources: Statutes 
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2010).  
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-59b(a)(2) (West 2009).  
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(2) (McKinney 2009)).  
Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122, as amended by Act of March 27, 1804, ch. 56, 2 Stat. 
298 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2010)).  
 
Secondary Sources: Legal journal articles 
David A. Anderson, First Amendment Limitations on Tort Law, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 755 (2004).  
Patrick J. Borchers, Internet Libel: The Consequences of a Non-Rule Approach to Personal 
Jurisdiction, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 473 (2004).  
Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From 
Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19 (1990).  
Robert J. Condlin, “Defendant Veto” or “Totality of the Circumstances”? It’s Time for the 
Supreme Court to Straighten Out the Personal Jurisdiction Standard Once Again, 54 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 53 (2005). 
Developments, Internet Jurisdiction: A Comparative Analysis, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1031 (2007).  
Catherine Ross Dunham, Zippo-ing the Wrong Way: How the Internet Has Misdirected the 
Federal Courts in Their Personal Jurisdiction Analysis, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 559 (2009). 
C. Douglas Floyd & Shima Baradaran-Robison, Toward a Unified Test of Personal Jurisdiction 
in an Era of Widely Diffused Wrongs: The Relevance of Purpose and Effects, 81 IND. L. J. 601 
(2006). 
Scott Fruehwald, The Boundary of Personal Jurisdiction: The “Effects Test” and the Protection 
of Crazy Horse’s Name, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 381 (2004).   
Michael A. Geist, Is There a There? Toward Greater Certainty For Internet Jurisdiction, 16 
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1345 (2001). 
142 
 
Andrew F. Halaby, You Won’t Be Back: Making Sense of “Express Aiming” After 
Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 625 (2005). 
Allyson W. Haynes, The Short Arm of the Law: Simplifying Personal Jurisdiction Over Virtually 
Present Defendants, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 133 (2009). 
Scott T. Jansen, Comment, Oh, What a Tangled Web . . . The Continuing Evolution of Personal 
Jurisdiction Derived from Internet-Based Contacts, 71 MO. L. REV. 177 (2006). 
Rachael T. Krueger, Comment, Traditional Notions of Fair Play and Substantial Justice Lost in 
Cyberspace: Personal Jurisdiction and On-Line Defamatory Statements, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 
301 (2001). 
Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101 (2010). 
Alexander B. Punger, Recent Development, Mapping the World Wide Web: Using Calder v. 
Jones to Create a Framework for Analyzing when Statements Written on the Internet Give Rise to 
Personal Jurisdiction, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1952 (2009). 
Martin H. Redish, Of New Wine and Old Bottles: Personal Jurisdiction, the Internet and the 
Nature of Constitutional Evolution, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 575 (1998). 
Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The Predictability Principle in Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine: A 
Case Study on the Effects of a “Generally” Too Broad, but “Specifically” Too Narrow Approach 
to Minimum Contacts, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 135 (2005).  
Allan R. Stein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due Process Through the Lens of 
Regulatory Precision,  98 NW. U. L. REV. 411 (2004). 
David Wille, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet – Proposed Limits on State Jurisdiction over 
Data Communications in Tort Cases, 87 KY. L.J. 95 (1998). 
Dennis T. Yokoyama, You Can’t Always Use the Zippo Code: The Fallacy of a Uniform Theory 
of Internet Personal Jurisdiction, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1147 (2005).  
 
Secondary Sources: Books 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 870 (8th ed. 2004).  
JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? 
ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 31 (2008). 
 
Secondary Sources: General interest articles 
Mike Torralba,  State Courts rule libel lawsuits extend beyond borders, 34 THE NEWS MEDIA & 
THE LAW, No. 3, 34 (Summer 2010).  
